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Corporate Fundamental Responsibility: 
What Do Technology Companies Owe the 
World? 
HAOCHEN SUN* 
In this digital age, technology companies reign supreme. 
However, the power gained by these companies far exceeds 
the responsibilities they have assumed. The ongoing privacy 
protection and fake news scandals swirling around Face-
book clearly demonstrate this shocking asymmetry of power 
and responsibility. 
Legal reforms taking place in the United States in the 
past twenty years or so have failed to correct this asymmetry. 
Indeed, the U.S. Congress has enacted major statutes mini-
mizing the legal liabilities of technology companies with re-
spect to online infringing acts, privacy protection, and pay-
ment of taxes. While these statutes have promoted innova-
tion, they have also had the unintended effect of breeding 
irresponsibility among technology companies. 
Against this backdrop, this Article offers a new lens 
through which we can deal with the ethical crisis surround-
ing technology companies. It puts forward the concept of 
corporate fundamental responsibility as the ethical and le-
gal foundation for imposing three distinct responsibilities 
upon technology companies: to reciprocate users’ contribu-
tions, play their role positively, and confront injustices cre-
 
 *  Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Law & Technology Center, 
University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law. I am grateful to Shyam Balganesh, 
Barton Beebe, Anupam Chander, Sonia Katyal, Jedidiah Kroncke, David Law, 
Robert Merges, Frank Pasquale, Scott Veitch, and Anna Wu for their helpful con-
versations or comments. 
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ated by technological development. The Article further con-
siders how these responsibilities could be applied to improve 
protection of private data and to encourage responsible ex-
ercise of intellectual property rights by technology compa-
nies. 
The tripartite conception of corporate fundamental re-
sponsibility, this Article shows, is built upon the ethical the-
ories of reciprocity, role responsibility, and social justice. 
Therefore, corporate fundamental responsibility paves the 
way for technology law to embrace ethics whole-heartedly, 
creating new legal and ethical guidance for the benevolent 
behavior of technology companies. In developing technolo-
gies, collecting data, and regulating speech, technology 
company leaders must act responsibly for the future of hu-
manity. 
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INTRODUCTION 
[I]t’s clear now that we didn’t do enough to prevent 
[Facebook] from being used for harm as well. That 
goes for fake news, foreign interference in elections, 
and hate speech, as well as developers and data pri-
vacy. We didn’t take a broad enough view of our re-
sponsibility, and that was a big mistake.1 
– Mark Zuckerberg 
 
We live in an age of grotesque irony. Facebook has achieved 
unparalleled success among technology companies, attracting 2.3 
billion users in the fifteen years since its inception.2 However, it has 
also abused the trust of those users.3 In the biggest privacy scandal 
 
 1 Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary and the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and 
Transp., 115th Cong. 1 (2018) [hereinafter Facebook Hearing] (testimony of 
Mark Zuckerberg, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Facebook). 
 2 Meira Gebel, In 15 Years Facebook Has Amassed 2.3 Billion Us-
ers — More Than Followers of Christianity, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 4, 2019, 1:29 
PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-has-2-billion-plus-users-after-
15-years-2019-2. 
 3 See ROGER MCNAMEE, ZUCKED: WAKING UP TO THE FACEBOOK 
CATASTROPHE 2 (2019) (“Technology platforms, including Facebook and 
Google . . . have taken advantage of our trust, using sophisticated techniques to 
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in social network history, Facebook secretively sold private user 
data to Cambridge Analytica.4 It allowed its platform to become a 
vehicle for the fake news that likely swayed the 2016 presidential 
election in the United States.5 A judge even criticized Facebook as 
“a tool for evil” in a judicial ruling.6 
The irony of our age is that the responsibilities that technology 
companies have assumed are far disproportionate to the power that 
they have gained. When it comes to unchecked power, Facebook is 
by no means unique. In the past ten years or so, technology compa-
nies have become the world’s richest and most politically powerful 
corporate institutions.7 In collecting enormous amounts of data from 
the public, technology companies have become owners of one of the 
world’s most valuable resources.8 They regulate all kinds of speech 
 
prey on the weakest aspects of human psychology, to gather and exploit private 
data, and to craft business models that do not protect users from harm.”); Jor-
dan Valinsky et al., Facebook’s Bottomless Pit of Scandals, CNN (Dec. 20, 
2018), https://edition.cnn.com/interactive/2018/12/business/facebooks-year-of-
scandal/index.html. 
 4 See Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need 
to Know as Fallout Widens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://www.ny-
times.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-ex-
plained.html. 
 5 See Danielle Kurtzleben, Did Fake News on Facebook Help Elect Trump? 
Here’s What We Know, NPR (Apr. 11, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2018/04/11/601323233/6-facts-we-know-about-fake-news-
in-the-2016-election. 
 6 Facebook is a ‘Tool for Evil’, Says Judge as Mother Trolled Over 
Fake Claims She Tried to Kill a Baby Is Found Dead, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 7, 2017, 
9:36 AM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/07/facebook-tool-evil-
says-judge-mother-trolled-fake-claims-tried. 
 7 See JAMIE BARTLETT, THE PEOPLE VS TECH: HOW THE INTERNET IS 
KILLING DEMOCRACY (AND HOW WE SAVE IT) 1 (2018) (“In the coming few 
years either tech will destroy democracy and the social order as we know it, or 
politics will stamp its authority over the digital world. It is becoming increasingly 
clear that technology is currently winning this battle, crushing a diminished and 
enfeebled opponent.”); Stephen Johnston, Largest Companies 2008 vs. 2018, A 
Lot Has Changed, MILFORD (Jan. 31, 2018), https://milfordasset.com/in-
sights/largest-companies-2008-vs-2018-lot-changed (“Technology companies 
not only dominate our daily lives (how many times have you checked your iPhone 
today?) but also the ranking of world’s biggest companies.”). 
 8 The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data, 
ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-
worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data. 
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activities on their platforms, operating as governors of social com-
munication in the digital age.9 They develop new technologies such 
as artificial intelligence (“AI”), acting as decision-makers for the fu-
ture of humanity.10 
With great power, it is often said, comes great responsibility.11 
But leading technology companies have thus far reaped their profits 
with impunity, demonstrating no commitment to a conception of 
corporate responsibility commensurate with the nature and extent of 
their ever-expanding powers.12 While the public has invested their 
trust and support in technology companies such as Facebook, these 
companies have ignored their attendant responsibilities. Instead, 
 
 9 See Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes 
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1603 (2018) (arguing that 
“platforms should be thought of as operating as the New Governors of online 
speech”); Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. 
L.J. 1353, 1357 (2018) (cautioning that technology “corporations’ power over 
public discourse today is so concentrated and far-reaching that it resembles and 
arguably surpasses state power within its sphere”); Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveil-
lance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 105 (2018) (concluding that “we’ve 
created a new generation of surveillance intermediaries: large, powerful compa-
nies that stand between the government and our data and, in the process, help 
constrain government surveillance”). 
 10 See Haochen Sun, The Fundamental Right to Technology, 47 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2020) (describing how technology companies are developing 
AI to dominate the most important industrial sectors). 
 11 See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2415 (2015) 
(citing S. Lee & S. Ditko, Spider–Man, AMAZING FANTASY, Aug. 1962, at 13 
(“[I]n this world, with great power there must also come—great responsibility.”)). 
 12 See infra Section I.B.4. 
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they have created a “black box society”13 and new forms of oppres-
sion.14 Privacy breaches have become routine in the technology sec-
tor.15 Tax evasion or avoidance by technology companies is occur-
ring more frequently and on a larger scale than ever before, with 
Apple being named one of the largest tax avoiders in the United 
States16 and Amazon paying no income tax whatsoever.17 
Indeed, the major technology companies have been accused of 
being even more irresponsible than the financial institutions causing 
the 2008 financial crisis.18 The immediate regulatory response has 
 
 13 FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS 
THAT CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION 191 (2015) (arguing that the black 
box society is unjust because “[d]ata is becoming staggering in its breadth and 
depth, yet often the information most important to us is out of our reach, available 
only to insiders”). 
 14 Stephen Hawking has concluded that “[a]longside the benefits, AI will also 
bring dangers like powerful autonomous weapons or new ways for the few to op-
press the many.” Stephen Hawking Launches Centre for the Future of Intelli-
gence, U. CAMBRIDGE (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.cam.ac.uk/re-
search/news/the-best-or-worst-thing-to-happen-to-humanity-stephen-hawking-
launches-centre-for-the-future-of [hereinafter Stephen Hawking Launches Cen-
tre]; see also Noel Sharkey, End Technological Injustice! Is Your Face Safe?, 
FORBES (Dec. 11, 2018, 10:44 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/no-
elsharkey/2018/12/11/end-technological-injustice-make-the-safe-face-pledge-to-
day/#754275769af8 (“Everywhere new technology is being exploited to oppress 
the already oppressed. Whether you’re a woman, poor, an ethnic minority or just 
from the wrong side of the zip code, there’s an algorithm to oppress you.”). 
 15 Andrew Rossow, Why Data Breaches Are Becoming More Frequent and 
What You Need to Do, FORBES (May 23, 2018, 3:12 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewrossow/2018/05/23/why-data-breaches-are-
becoming-more-frequent-and-what-you-need-to-do/#256231fad97f. 
 16 Apple ‘Among Largest Tax Avoiders in US’ — Senate Committee, BBC 
(May 21, 2013), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-22600984. 
 17 Glenn Kessler, Does Amazon Pay Any Taxes?, WASH. POST (July 30, 2019, 
9:05 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/live-updates/general-
election/fact-checking-the-second-democratic-debate/does-amazon-pay-any-
taxes/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.c6710225845a (highlighting Bernie Sanders’s 
statement that “[r]ight now, 500,000 Americans are sleeping out on the street and 
yet companies like Amazon that made billions in profits did not pay one nickel in 
federal income tax”); Vanessa Barford & Gerry Holt, Google, Amazon, Starbucks: 
The Rise of ‘Tax Shaming’, BBC (May 21, 2013), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-20560359. 
 18 Saqib Shah, Banks Behind Financial Crash Were Better Behaved Than Fa-
cebook, Says Ex-Goldman Sachs President Gary Cohn, SUN (Aug. 7, 2018, 10:13 
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been to impose hefty fines upon technology companies. For in-
stance, in July 2019 the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) im-
posed on Facebook a fine of about $5 billion for its mishandling of 
private data.19 Although this is the largest fine the FTC has ever is-
sued,20 it has nonetheless triggered heated debate over whether it is 
an effective deterrent. The FTC’s decision was followed by a surge 
in Facebook’s stock price, which led to claims that it actually in-
creased Mark Zuckerberg’s net worth. 21  Legislators have pro-
claimed that the FTC “failed miserably” with this “inadequate” and 
“historically hollow” decision, asserting that it is “time for Congress 
to act.”22 
Against this backdrop, I put forward in this Article the idea of 
corporate fundamental responsibility: a new lens through which we 
can scrutinize technology companies and address the ethical crisis 
surrounding them. Amid a crisis of responsibility, monetary fines—
even staggering ones—are no cure. Punitive measures are back-
ward-looking, reactive, and ultimately inadequate for changing the 
behavior of today’s tech behemoths. What is needed, instead, is an 
affirmative vision of the nature and scope of the responsibilities that 
technology companies should accept.23 To this end, I argue for a tri-
 
AM), https://www.thesun.co.uk/tech/6958511/banks-more-responsible-than-fa-
cebook-says-goldman-sachs (“[B]anks were more responsible citizens in ‘08 than 
some of the social-media companies are today. And it affects everyone in the 
world. The banks have never had that much pull.”). 
 19 Cecilia Kang, F.T.C. Approves Facebook Fine of About $5 Billion, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 12, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/12/technology/face-
book-ftc-fine.html. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Nilay Patel, Facebook’s $5 Billion FTC Fine Is an Embarrassing Joke, 
VERGE (July 12, 2019, 9:05 PM), https://www.thev-
erge.com/2019/7/12/20692524/facebook-five-billion-ftc-fine-embarrassing-joke 
(reporting the view that “the United States government spent months coming up 
with a punishment for Facebook’s long list of privacy-related bad behavior, and 
the best it could do was so weak that Facebook’s stock price went up”). 
 22 Id. (“Senator Ron Wyden has said that the FTC has ‘failed miserably.’ Sen-
ator Richard Blumenthal has said the decision is ‘inadequate’ and ‘historically 
hollow,’ and Senator Mark Warner has said ‘[i]t’s time for Congress to act.’”). 
 23 For a detailed account of the affirmative vision of responsibility, see gen-
erally YASCHA MOUNK, THE AGE OF RESPONSIBILITY: LUCK, CHOICE, AND THE 
WELFARE STATE (2017); JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED 
LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES (2013). 
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partite conception of corporate responsibility that reflects the reali-
ties of the technology industry today. According to this conception, 
technology companies should do the following: reciprocate users’ 
contributions, play their role positively, and confront injustices cre-
ated by technological development.24 
These three fundamental responsibilities are crucial to protect-
ing the public interest and positively shaping humanity’s future. 
First, the responsibility to reciprocate would require technology 
companies to appreciate users’ contributions and take adequate ac-
tion to protect their interests.25 Because of this responsibility, tech-
nology companies must protect the personal data they collect from 
their users. Second, the responsibility to perform their role posi-
tively would require technology companies to consider their role in 
social communication and innovation.26 This responsibility protects 
freedom of expression and promotes responsible innovation. Third, 
the responsibility to promote social justice would require technology 
companies to confront injustices created by technological develop-
ment, such as uneven income distribution and labor market polari-
zation,27 and take positive measures to deal with them.28 
This concept of corporate fundamental responsibility, as I will 
further analyze in this Article, makes three major contributions to 
the existing literature and policy discourse on technology, law, and 
the public interest. First, it proposes a new approach to applying law 
and ethics to deal with the detrimental effects of technology. We are 
currently at a crossroads in harnessing technology that will deeply 
influence the future of humanity.29 The waves of technological pro-
gress seen in recent decades have resulted in such breakthroughs as 
3D printing, AI, new medicines, and renewable energy, among 
 
 24 See infra Part II. 
 25 See infra Section II.A.2. 
 26 See infra Section II.B.2. 
 27 See, e.g., CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG 
DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 105–22 (2016); 
Cynthia Estlund, What Should We Do After Work? Automation and Employment 
Law, 128 YALE L.J. 254, 258 (2018). 
 28 See infra Section II.C.2. 
 29 See BRETT FRISCHMANN & EVAN SELINGER, RE-ENGINEERING HUMANITY 
1 (2018) (“As we collectively race down the path toward smart techno-social sys-
tems that efficiently govern more and more of our lives, we run the risk of losing 
ourselves along the way.”). 
906 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:898 
 
many others. 30  However, technological breakthroughs have also 
raised serious ethical concerns due to their potentially detrimental 
effects.31 For example, industrial leaders have cautioned that the re-
cent, rapid development of AI may lead to a third world war32 or 
even bring about humanity’s end.33 Relying on the concept of cor-
porate fundamental responsibility, this Article urges that it is incum-
bent upon technology companies to seriously consider their role in 
minimizing technology’s detrimental effects. To do so, they must 
properly respond to the legitimate needs of technology users and 
promote social justice. 
Second, this Article deals with inadequacies in the conventional 
concept of corporate social responsibility in its legal application to 
technology companies. Since its inception, the concept of corporate 
social responsibility has remained weak and few companies have 
ever taken it seriously.34 I contend that companies’ social responsi-
bilities must be made as concrete as possible so that they can serve 
 
 30 See ANDREW MCAFEE & ERIK BRYNJOLFSSON, MACHINE, PLATFORM, 
CROWD: HARNESSING OUR DIGITAL FUTURE 330 (2017) (“We have more power-
ful technology at our disposal than ever before, both as individuals and as a soci-
ety.”). 
 31 See generally, e.g., MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE QUESTION CONCERNING 
TECHNOLOGY AND OTHER ESSAYS (1977) (discussing the dangerous orientation 
of technology); HANS JONAS, THE IMPERATIVE OF RESPONSIBILITY: IN SEARCH OF 
AN ETHICS FOR THE TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (1985) (pointing out the threats posed 
by modern technology). 
 32 Alex Hern, Elon Musk Says AI Could Lead to Third World War, GUARDIAN 
(Sept. 4, 2017, 6:58 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technol-
ogy/2017/sep/04/elon-musk-ai-third-world-war-vladimir-putin; Catherine 
Clifford, Elon Musk: ‘Mark My Words — A.I. Is Far More Danger-
ous than Nukes’, CNBC (Mar. 13, 2018, 1:22 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/13/elon-musk-at-sxsw-a-i-is-more-dangerous-
than-nuclear-weapons.html; Ryan Browne, Alibaba’s Jack Ma Suggests Technol-
ogy Could Result in a New World War, CNBC (Jan. 23, 2019, 9:29 AM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/01/23/alibaba-jack-ma-suggests-technology-could-
result-in-a-new-world-war.html. 
 33 Stephen Hawking Launches Centre, supra note 14 (reporting Stephen 
Hawking’s comment that “the rise of powerful AI will be either the best, or the 
worst thing, ever to happen to humanity”). 
 34 See, e.g., Anupam Chander, Googling Freedom, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 6 
(2011) (“The many volumes theorizing corporate social responsibility often fail 
even to consider the possibility that those providing information services over the 
Internet have such responsibilities.”). 
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as conduct codes for corporate managers. This concept of corporate 
fundamental responsibility clearly identifies three fundamental re-
sponsibilities that technology companies must accept. The idea of 
corporate social responsibility has not been implemented legally 
through legislative reforms and judicial rulings. To address this 
problem, I discuss how the concept of corporate fundamental re-
sponsibility could be enforced effectively through privacy and intel-
lectual property law. I argue that technology companies should opt 
for the highest legal standards—such as those contained in the Eu-
ropean Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”)35—
to protect personal data adequately.36 Drawing on Federal Trade 
Commission v. Qualcomm, Inc.,37 I examine how technology com-
panies should exercise their intellectual property rights responsibly.  
Third, this Article offers a constructive solution to a theoretical 
as well as a practical issue that the information fiduciary approach 
has not yet addressed. This groundbreaking approach, championed 
by Professor Jack Balkin, has received a lot of attention. Based on 
the conventional fiduciary doctrine, the information fiduciary ap-
proach sees technology companies as the fiduciaries of their users’ 
private data, thereby imposing heightened duties upon corporate 
managers in protecting the private data.38 However, this approach 
 
 35 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Pro-
cessing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 
[hereinafter GDPR]. 
 36 See infra Section III.A. 
 37 Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Qualcomm Inc., 935 F.3d 752 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 38 Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1209 (2016) [hereinafter Balkin, Information Fidu-
ciaries and the First Amendment] (“An information fiduciary is a person or busi-
ness who, because of their relationship with another, has taken on special duties 
with respect to the information they obtain in the course of the relationship. People 
and organizations that have fiduciary duties arising from the use and exchange of 
information are information fiduciaries whether or not they also do other things 
on the client’s behalf, like manage an estate or perform legal or medical ser-
vices.”); Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Pri-
vate Governance, and New School Speech Regulation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1149, 1162 (2018) [hereinafter Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic So-
ciety] (“Who are the new information fiduciaries in the digital age? They are or-
ganizations and enterprises who collect enormous amounts of information about 
their end-users.”). 
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neglects the concurrent fiduciary duty of corporate managers to 
serve their shareholders’ interests.39 While corporate managers must 
protect users’ interests in personal data as the information fiduciary 
approach suggests, they must also fulfill their fiduciary duties to 
maximize their shareholders’ interests.40 A major problem with the 
information fiduciary approach, therefore, is its inability to address 
this potential conflict. 
Without relying on the conventional fiduciary doctrine, the con-
cept of corporate fundamental responsibility applies the ethical the-
ories of reciprocity, role responsibility, and social justice. As I will 
show in this Article, this concept offers a theoretical account of why 
the fundamental responsibilities of technology companies could 
trump corporate managers’ fiduciary duty to shareholders of these 
companies. Moreover, the concept deals not only with the protection 
of private data but also responsible use of intellectual property by 
technology companies, which is an issue of pivotal importance for 
guarding the public interest.41 
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows. In Part I, 
I reveal that both the shareholder value theory and U.S. legal reforms 
of the past twenty years or so have led technology companies to ne-
glect their fundamental responsibilities. I then put forward in Part II 
the concept of corporate fundamental responsibility. Drawing on the 
 
 39 See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976–77 (Del. 1977) (noting 
that under Delaware law, officers, directors, and controlling shareholders are cor-
porate fiduciaries), overruled on other grounds by Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 
A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 40 See Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fi-
duciaries, 133 HARV. L. REV. 497, 503 (2019) (“Balkin’s central example of a 
purported information fiduciary, Facebook, is a Delaware corporation. So are his 
other main examples, Google, Twitter, and Uber. Under Delaware law, the offic-
ers and directors of a for-profit corporation already owe fiduciary duties — to the 
corporation and its stockholders.”); Philip Lynch, Human Rights and Corporate 
Social Responsibility: An Australian Perspective, 1 CORP. GOVERNANCE L. REV. 
402, 416 (2006) (pointing out that charity schemes in favor of social and environ-
mental interests should be “subverted to shareholders’ financial interests to the 
extent of any incompatibility or inconsistency”).  
 41 See Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelli-
gence, 66 UCLA L. REV. 54, 60 (2019) (pointing out that “the true potential of AI 
does not lie in the information we reveal to one another, but rather, in the questions 
they raise about the interaction of technology, intellectual property, and civil 
rights”). 
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ethical theories of reciprocity, role responsibility, and social justice, 
I discuss how and why three fundamental responsibilities should be 
imposed upon technology companies. In Part III, I further analyze 
how these responsibilities could be enforced legally and ethically to 
protect personal data and promote responsible use of intellectual 
property by technology companies. 
I. CREATING THE AGE OF IRRESPONSIBILITY 
A. Theoretical Support for Minimizing Responsibilities 
For decades, shareholder value theory has catalyzed the minimi-
zation of technology companies’ responsibilities, leading the world 
to fully support the maximization of their wealth growth as they con-
tinue to innovate new technologies. This theory first emerged as a 
dominant and influential school of thought in shaping the develop-
ment of corporate responsibilities to society.42 Nobel Laureate in 
Economics Milton Friedman was the main champion of this theory. 
In Capitalism and Freedom, published in 1962, he stated the follow-
ing: 
The view has been gaining widespread acceptance 
that corporate officials and labor leaders have a “so-
cial responsibility” that goes beyond serving the in-
terest of their stockholders or their members. This 
view shows a fundamental misconception of the 
character and nature of a free economy. In such an 
economy, there is one and only one social responsi-
bility of business—to use its resources and engage in 
activities designed to increase its profits so long as it 
stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, 
engages in open and free competition, without decep-
tion or fraud.43 
 
 42 See Domènec Melé, Corporate Social Responsibility Theories, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 47, 56 (Andrew 
Crane et al. eds., 2008) (pointing out that shareholder value theory “has been dom-
inant in many business schools”). 
 43 MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962). 
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According to this opinion, the only social responsibility of a 
company is to make as much profit as possible for its shareholders. 
To this end, the directors of a company, who serve as agents man-
aging the company for the shareholders as principals, should make 
decisions designed to maximize shareholders’ interests. 44  There-
fore, corporate directors’ responsibility is solely to serve sharehold-
ers’ interests rather than societal interests at large.45 
Against this backdrop, shareholder value theory categorically 
denies that companies should be legally required to take any social 
responsibility. 46  In Friedman’s eyes, companies are, by nature, 
profit-maximizing institutions. 47  As long as they pursue profit-
driven agendas legally, the law must not impose any social respon-
sibilities upon them.48  Social responsibility initiatives would di-
rectly prevent corporate directors from wholeheartedly serving 
shareholders’ interests, thereby indirectly undermining the bedrock 
of a free economy.49 
Shareholder value theory has been applied to fundamentally 
shape corporate law’s exclusion of social responsibilities and effec-
tively defy corporate social responsibility initiatives. Based upon 
 
 44 Friedman further clarified his opinion in a later New York Times article, 
stating that “the manager is the agent of the individuals who own the corporation 
or establish the eleemosynary institution, and his primary responsibility is to 
them.” Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase its 
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, § 6 (Magazine), at 33. 
 45 Id. (“[A] corporate executive . . . has direct responsibility to conduct the 
business in accordance with [shareholder] desires, which generally will be to 
make as much money as possible while conforming to [the] basic rules of the 
society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical custom.”). 
 46 José Salazar & Bryan W. Husted, Principals and Agents: Further Thoughts 
on the Friedmanite Critique of Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 42, at 137, 150 
(“Friedman’s original critique of corporate social responsibility remains one of 
the most important in the CSR literature.”). 
 47 FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 33 (“[T]here is one and only one social re-
sponsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities designed to 
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, 
engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud.”). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 135 (stating that of “the claim that business should contribute to the 
support of charitable activities and especially to universities” that “[s]uch giving 
by corporations is an inappropriate use of corporate funds in a free-enterprise so-
ciety”). 
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this theory, U.S. corporate law treats companies as profit-maximiz-
ing institutions and thereby imposes no social responsibilities upon 
them.50 The fiduciary duty doctrine epitomizes the law’s espousal of 
shareholder value theory.51 Pursuant to this doctrine, the directors of 
a company, in carrying out their managerial tasks, are charged with 
certain fiduciary duties to the shareholders of the company.52 The 
doctrine primarily imposes a duty of care and a duty of loyalty. The 
duty of care requires that “prior to making a business decision,” di-
rectors inform themselves “of all material information reasonably 
available to them.”53 Rather than simply accept information pre-
sented to them, directors must assess this information with a “critical 
eye” in order to protect the interests of the corporation and its share-
holders.54 The duty of loyalty requires that, in serving as corporate 
fiduciaries, the directors and officers of a company should make all 
decisions in good faith and in the best interest of the shareholders.55 
Therefore, this duty elevates “stockholder welfare as the only end” 
of corporate decisions, thereby only allowing the consideration of 
 
 50 It is worth noting that corporate tax should be deemed a compulsory legal 
duty under tax law rather than a social responsibility. 
 51 See Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership 
and Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 464 (2001) (“A di-
rector’s duty of loyalty is another type of legal rule that can help to provide a 
protective environment for investors [because] . . . managerial self-dealing will 
potentially constitute breaches of duty.”); Simon Johnson et al., Tunneling, 90 
AM. ECON. REV. 22, 26 (2000) (discussing how the duties of loyalty and care are 
important in protecting minority shareholder rights, which promotes the develop-
ment of capital markets). 
 52 See, e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919); Fran-
cis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 824 (N.J. 1981); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986); Polk v. Good, 507 
A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986). 
 53 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). In practice, whether the 
directors were informed of all the relevant information depends on the quality of 
the information, the advice available, and whether the directors had “sufficient 
opportunity to acquire knowledge concerning the problem before acting.” Moran 
v. Household Intern., Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1075 (Del. Ch. 1985). 
 54 Smith v. Van Gorkem, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
 55 According to the Delaware Supreme Court, “[c]orporate officers and di-
rectors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further 
their private interests.” Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
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“other interests” that are “rationally related to stockholder wel-
fare.”56 
Due to the dominance of shareholder value theory in policy-
making, theorist and activist campaigns for corporate social respon-
sibility have produced only limited effects. Scholars have put for-
ward ethical responsibility and corporate citizenship theories to jus-
tify corporate social responsibility. These theories have lent strong 
support to the creation of corporate social responsibility initiatives 
such as the United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Trans-
national Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard 
to Human Rights.57 However, only a tiny proportion of major cor-
porations in the world are members of such initiatives.58 
Having instead focused on issues such as environmental protec-
tion, scholars and policy-makers have not yet comprehensively scru-
tinized the relationship between corporate social responsibility and 
technology companies.59 In fact, in the past twenty years or so, the 
major technology companies have been largely immune from scru-
tiny over whether they should have strong social responsibilities im-
posed upon them. Many scholars and policy-makers have forcefully 
argued that technology companies—in particular online intermedi-
aries—should bear as few responsibilities as possible. Otherwise, 
technology companies would be financially over-burdened and their 
innovation would ultimately be stifled, resulting in graver financial 
losses.60 Following this line of reasoning, Congress adopted laws 
minimizing the responsibilities of online intermediaries.61 
 
 56 Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., No. 12108, 2017 WL 
1437308, at *17 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2017). 
 57 U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003). 
 58 Alwyn Lim & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, The Social Regulation of the Economy in 
the Global Context, in CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A GLOBALIZING 
WORLD 12 (Kiyoteru Tsutsui & Alwyn Lim eds., 2015). 
 59 Id. at 8–9. 
 60 See Anupam Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, 63 EMORY L.J. 639, 
645 (2014) [hereinafter Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley] (discussing 
these policy arguments). 
 61 Id. 
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The upshot of the minimization of technology companies’ re-
sponsibilities is that the whole world cares too much about the eco-
nomic value of these companies. Those who invest in technology 
companies are primarily interested in whether these companies can 
eventually go public and how much their stock value will soar. The 
media has become a cheerleader, following and reporting technol-
ogy companies’ stock market listing successes.62 Therefore, as tech-
nology companies’ wealth has skyrocketed, they have been immune 
from ethical scrutiny of their responsibilities.63  
B. Legal Support for Minimizing Responsibilities 
Swayed by the shareholder value theory, the U.S. Congress has 
enacted major statutes to minimize the legal liability of technology 
companies with respect to online infringing acts, privacy protection, 
and payment of taxes. However, these legal reforms have had the 
unintended consequence of breeding a mentality of irresponsibility 
among many technology companies.64 
1. EXEMPTING LIABILITIES OF INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS 
In the 1990s, reforms of intermediary platforms’ legal liabilities 
contributed tremendously to the rapid growth of technology compa-
nies. Under the Clinton administration, laws and regulations that 
hindered electronic commerce were reviewed, and in some cases 
 
 62 See Ryan Chittum, The Press and the Tech Bubble, COLUM. JOURNALISM 
REV. (Apr. 9, 2014), https://archives.cjr.org/the_audit/thinking_about_the_bub-
ble.php. 
 63 A notable exception is the recent media discussion about Uber’s IPO. See, 
e.g., Farhad Manjoo, The Uber I.P.O. Is a Moral Stain on Silicon Valley, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/01/opinion/uber-
ipo.html. 
 64 See Haochen Sun, Copyright and Responsibility, 4 HARV. J. SPORTS & 
ENT. L. 263, 271 (2013) [hereinafter Sun, Copyright] (explaining how “us[ing] 
the language of rights and its rhetorical power” can cause irresponsibility mental-
ity); SCOTT VEITCH, LAW AND IRRESPONSIBILITY: ON THE LEGITIMATION OF 
HUMAN SUFFERING 72 (2007) (“Immunised by the mechanisms of responsibility 
transference, underpinned by the naturalised economic realm of rights to private 
property upheld at almost any cost by state institutions, the irresponsible mentality 
appears not only as widely prevalent, but as legitimate. And such organized irre-
sponsibility and legitimised immunities are call ‘the law.’”). 
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eliminated, to respond to the needs of a new era of digital technol-
ogy.65 
The first stage of legal reforms dealt with the extent to which 
Internet service providers should be shielded from civil liability for 
online infringing acts. Congress enacted the Communications De-
cency Act (“CDA”) in 1996 as a legal tool to give Internet service 
providers immunity from their platform users’ illegal activities, such 
as spreading defamatory information and provoking racial discrim-
ination.66 Before 1996, judicial rulings had exposed Internet service 
providers to high risks, holding them accountable for illegal activi-
ties occurring on their platforms. In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prod-
igy Services Co.,67 an investment firm sued Prodigy, an Internet ser-
vice provider, for defamation based on comments by a third party 
on Prodigy’s online bulletin boards.68 Because of its editorial con-
trol, Prodigy was found liable as the publisher of the bulletin board 
content created by its users.69 By overruling Stratton Oakmont, § 
230 of the CDA provides that Internet service providers should not 
be treated as publishers of material that they did not develop,70 
thereby generally protecting them from liability for user-generated 
content. 
Given that § 230 does not deal with intellectual property 
claims,71 the second stage of legal reforms dealt with the extent to 
which Internet service providers should be exempted from copyright 
liabilities arising from online infringing acts. The online platforms 
operated by Internet service providers allowed their users to repro-
duce and disseminate copyrighted works with unprecedented ease. 
The frequency with which users might infringe copyrights exposed 
Internet service providers to contributory or vicarious liabilities to a 
 
 65 William J. Clinton & Albert Gore, Jr., A Framework for Global Electronic 
Commerce: Read the Framework, CLINTON WHITE HOUSE, https://clin-
tonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/WH/New/Commerce/read.html (last visited Jan. 
18, 2020). 
 66 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, §§ 501–61, 110 
Stat. 56, 133–43 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 47 U.S.C.). 
 67 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995). 
 68 Id. at *1. 
 69 Id. at *7. 
 70 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) (2018). 
 71 Id. § 230(e)(2). 
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dire and unmanageable extent.72 In this context, the Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) was enacted in 1998 to set up a safe 
harbour for Internet service providers, shielding them from liability 
for their users’ infringements of copyright.73 
The DMCA has contributed positively to the legitimacy and sur-
vival of Internet service providers. One of DMCA’s primary legis-
lative objectives was to preserve “strong incentives for service pro-
viders and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with 
copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked en-
vironment.” 74  This collaboration operates as a notice-and-take-
down system, whereby copyright owners have the right to order In-
ternet service providers to remove works and in return the latter are 
immunized from copyright infringement liabilities.75  
2. WEAKENING PRIVACY PROTECTION 
The current privacy protection regime in the U.S. is focused on 
addressing technological innovation. Not only is there a lack of 
strong privacy regulations and laws, but the existing laws appear to 
accommodate the interests of technology companies.76 
 
 72 BRIAN YEH & ROBIN JEWELER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32037, SAFE 
HARBOR FOR SERVICE PROVIDERS UNDER THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT 
ACT 1 (2004). 
 73 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 201–03, 112 
Stat. 2860, 2877–86 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 17, 
28, and 35 U.S.C.). 
 74 H.R. REP. NO. 105-796, at 72 (1998) (Conf. Rep.). 
 75 17 U.S.C. §§ 512(b)(E), (c)(C), (d)(3) (2018). 
 76 A lax privacy regime allows Internet service providers to accumulate high 
profits while also allowing for greater innovation. For instance, Chander notices 
that many Internet services rely upon a trial-and-error for innovation. Chander, 
How Law Made Silicon Valley, supra note 60, at 666–67. What this means is that 
Internet services may test out new products or programs on their website and see 
how users respond. Id. Depending on this response, their product or program can 
be retracted completely or modified. Id. This type of experimentation allows these 
Internet companies to respond quickly to the market. Id. This reveals how weak 
privacy laws have actually enabled high technology firms to flourish into corpo-
rations worth billions of dollars. 
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The U.S. privacy protection regime has been accused of being 
generally less robust than its E.U. counterpart.77 This stems partly 
from the weak status of information privacy in the U.S. Constitution. 
In terms of privacy protection, the Constitution only guards against 
intrusion by the government, thereby playing little role in governing 
breach of privacy by private actors.78 In this sense, the free flow of 
information through private transactions has been given priority 
over the right to privacy. Further, the Constitution does not protect 
privacy as a fundamental right. Rather, this right is accepted as im-
plied in the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.79  
The United States also lacks a single, coherent and comprehen-
sive federal law that regulates the collection and use of personal data. 
Instead, it has chosen to implement sector-specific (e.g., financial 
institutions, healthcare entities, and communications common carri-
ers) and type of information-specific (e.g., children’s information on 
the Internet) federal data protection laws, complemented by state 
laws, administrative regulations, and industry specific self-regula-
tory guidelines.80 This sectoral approach to personal data protection 
can be seen as a piecemeal response to privacy issues arising in spe-
cific sectors that leaves large areas, such as collection of personal 
data, unregulated in the age of big data and AI.81 The mishmash of 
federal, state, and industry regulations create overlapping and con-
tradictory protections. Furthermore, these data privacy laws are 
largely based on the principles of both tort law and contract law, 
which can result in conflicting interpretations and applications.82 
 
 77 See, e.g., Shawn Marie Boyne, Data Protection in the United States, 66 
AM. J. COMP. L. 299, 299 n.3 (2018); Svetlana Yakovleva, Privacy Protec-
tion(ism): The Latest Wave of Trade Constraints on Regulatory Autonomy, 74 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 416, 473–81 (2020). 
 78 Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy 
Law, 106 GEO. L.J. 115, 155 (2017). 
 79 U.S. CONST. amends. IV, V, XIV. 
 80 Boyne, supra note 77, at 299. 
 81 See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common 
Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 587 (2014); Avner Levin & Mary Jo 
Nicholson, Privacy Law in the United States, the EU and Canada: The Allure of 
the Middle Ground, 2 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J. 357, 361–67 (2005). 
 82 Carolyn Hoang, In the Middle: Creating a Middle Road Between U.S. and 
EU Data Protection Policies, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 810, 843 
(2012). 
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Moreover, the absence of a designated central data protection 
authority has been another factor contributing to weak protection of 
personal data in the United States.83 The FTC has essentially as-
sumed responsibility for consumer protection, which covers the 
online protection of personal data.84 However, the FTC can only 
provide limited protection due to inherent problems in the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”).85 Section 45(a) of the FTCA is 
seen as restrictive, as it only enables users to sue in cases where an 
Internet service provider has committed “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in or affecting commerce.”86 It essentially means, as Pro-
fessor Anupam Chander notes, that “as long as the services do not 
promise more privacy than they actually deliver, online companies 
in the United States have a free hand with information.”87 
3. PROVIDING TAX DEDUCTION INCENTIVES 
Legal reforms also pushed for the provision of tax incentives to 
technology companies. In 1998, the U.S. Congress enacted the In-
ternet Tax Freedom Act (“ITFA”).88 The underpinnings of this Act 
were to promote the growth and development of the Internet and its 
commercial, educational, and informational potential at a time when 
its preservation was seen as a necessity.89 As Conyers states, “[t]he 
act was intended as a temporary measure to assist and nurture the 
 
 83 Steven Chabinsky & F. Paul Pittman, USA: Data Protection 2019, ICLG 
(Mar. 7, 2019), https://iclg.com/practice-areas/data-protection-laws-and-regula-
tions/usa. 
 84 See generally Bureau of Consumer Protection, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2020) (explaining that “[t]he FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protec-
tion stops unfair, deceptive and fraudulent business practices by collecting com-
plaints and conducting investigations, suing companies and people that break the 
law, developing rules to maintain a fair marketplace, and educating consumers 
and businesses about their rights and responsibilities”). 
 85 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2018). 
 86 Id. at § 45(a)(1). 
 87 Chander, How Law Made Silicon Valley, supra note 60, at 667. 
 88 Internet Tax Freedom Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). 
 89 Grant Gross, U.S. House Approves Permanent Ban on Internet Access 
Taxes, PC WORLD (July 15, 2014, 12:03 PM), https://www.pcworld.com/arti-
cle/2454420/us-house-approves-permanent-ban-on-internet-access-taxes.html. 
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fledgling Internet that back in 1998 was still in its commercial in-
fancy.”90 The ITFA prevented state and local governments from tax-
ing Internet access or imposing multiple or discriminatory taxes on 
electronic commerce.91 As a result, exposure and support for what 
are now billion-dollar Internet companies such as Google were not 
compromised.  
Moreover, the U.S. government supports business research and 
development (“R&D”) through direct R&D funding as well as tax 
incentives. In the U.S. federal tax system, two tax incentives are pro-
vided for business R&D investment. The first is an unlimited ex-
pensing allowance for qualified research spending.92 The second 
and most important is the research and experimentation tax credit, 
which provides a non-refundable income tax credit for qualified 
R&D expenditures.93 This corporate R&D tax credit was established 
in 1981 with the aim of incentivizing technological innovation in 
response to the decline in R&D expenditures relative to the real 
gross national product from 1968 to 1979.94 The recent tax reform 
increases the tax value of the R&D tax credit indirectly and encour-
ages corporations to relocate their R&D activities back to the United 
States.95 The maximum assistance available to large corporates by 
way of R&D tax credit is 15.8% of qualified research expenditure.96 
 
 90 Id. 
 91 Id. 
 92 26 U.S.C. § 174 (2012). 
 93 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221, 95 Stat. 
172, 241–47. 
 94 STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 97TH CONG., GENERAL 
EXPLANATION OF THE ECONOMIC RECOVERY TAX ACT OF 1981 119–20 (Comm. 
Print 1981) (“In the case of research and development activities conducted by 
business, company-financed and Federal expenditures over the 12-year period 
1968–79 remained at a fairly stable level in real terms, fluctuating between $19 
and $22.8 billion in constant dollars. Relative to real gross national product, such 
expenditures for company research declined from 2.01 percent in 1968 to 1.58 
percent in 1975, essentially remaining at that level since then.”). 
 95 ERNST & YOUNG, R&D INCENTIVES CONTINUE TO DRAW GOVERNMENT 
FAVOR: REFLECTIONS FROM EY’S THE OUTLOOK FOR GLOBAL TAX POLICY IN 
2018 9 (2018), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-rd-incentives-
in-2018/$FILE/ey-rd-incentives-in-2018.pdf. 
 96 DELOITTE, SURVEY OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT AND INNOVATION 
INCENTIVES 269 (2018), https://www2.deloitte.com/con-
tent/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-survey-of-global-investment-
and-innovation-incentives.pdf. 
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Major technology companies have benefited tremendously from 
tax incentive regimes. For instance, Tesla received a $1.25 billion 
tax break over twenty years for its deal to build a battery factory in 
Nevada, and Apple received a $214 million tax break for setting up 
a data center in Iowa.97 Tax incentives like these are of importance 
to technology companies, especially those in the start-up period. For 
a lot of start-up companies in the technology field, finding and keep-
ing the right technically skilled workers can be a challenge and their 
revenues may be low while costs soar.98 Presenting firms with tax 
incentives, therefore, helps stabilize their workforce.99 
4. BREEDING A MENTALITY OF IRRESPONSIBILITY 
Although the lax regulatory system introduced by the statutes 
discussed above undoubtedly promoted innovation, it has created an 
environment in which technology companies have been able to act 
irresponsibly. Without users’ knowledge or consent, these compa-
nies have disclosed personal data to third parties and/or used private 
data for targeted advertising. 
Beyond the Cambridge Analytica scandal, Facebook has mis-
used private data in a considerable number of incidents. In 2011, 
Facebook agreed to settle FTC charges alleging it had made false 
and misleading material statements to its users related to user pri-
vacy.100 Facebook deceived its users by assuring them they could 
 
 97 Ron Miller, Amazon Isn’t the Only Tech Company Getting Tax Breaks, 
TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 25, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/08/25/am-
azon-isnt-the-only-tech-company-getting-tax-breaks. 
 98 Lynda Finan, Government Investment in Technology: How Governments 
Use Tax Regimes to Attract R&D Activity, DLA PIPER (Jan. 17, 2018), 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/uk/insights/publications/2018/01/government-in-
vestment-in-technology. 
 99 Id. Tax incentives allow high tech firms to focus on research and develop-
ment. Research and development lead to innovation, and, in a highly competitive 
field like technology, innovation is crucial for business survival. The United King-
dom has set out objectives such as a $2.3 billion investment into research and 
development in 2021 and 2022 in order to secure themselves as the most innova-
tive nation by 2030. Id. This objective of the United Kingdom perfectly demon-
strates the importance of research and development, and, thus, highlights why tax 
incentives can be of high importance for technology firms. 
 100 Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It Deceived Consumers by Failing to 
Keep Privacy Promises, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Nov. 29, 2011), 
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keep their information on Facebook private, and then, without their 
knowledge or consent, repeatedly allowing it to be shared and made 
public.101 It was reported that Facebook had harvested the email 
contacts of 1.5 million users without their knowledge or consent 
since May 2016, asking new users for email passwords and then im-
porting email contacts without users’ permission.102 Due to a soft-
ware glitch, Google inadvertently exposed the name, email ad-
dresses, age and other personal information of 52.5 million Google+ 
users to third party developers between 2015 and March 2018,103 
causing Google to accelerate its plan to shut down Google+. 104 
However, it was reported that Google intentionally opted not to dis-
close the incident as early as possible, partly because it was worried 
the incident would trigger “immediate regulatory interest” and lead 
to reputational damage.105 
Moreover, technology companies have irresponsibly operated 
targeted advertising by taking advantage of users’ personal data 
without their consent. If a user searches for a product using Google’s 
search engine service, an advertisement for the same product may 
appear on their Instagram feed shortly afterwards. Internet users are 
also likely to be familiar with variations of the statement “this web-
site uses cookies for the best possible search experience.” In this 
 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-
charges-it-deceived-consumers-failing-keep. 
 101 Id. The settlement agreement, which became final in 2012, prohibited Fa-
cebook from misrepresenting the extent to which it maintained their data privacy 
and security and required Facebook to seek express consent from its users before 
sharing their information beyond their privacy settings. Facebook, Inc., 0923184 
F.T.C. No. C-4365, at 3–4 (2012); see also FTC Approves Final Settlement with 
Facebook, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2012/08/ftc-approves-final-settlement-facebook. 
 102 Rob Price, Facebook Says it ‘Unintentionally Uploaded’ 1.5 Million Peo-
ple’s Email Contacts Without Their Consent, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 17, 2019, 8:07 
PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-uploaded-1-5-million-users-
email-contacts-without-permission-2019-4?r=US&IR=T. 
 103 Douglas MacMillan & Robert McMillan, Google Exposed User Data, 
Feared Repercussions of Disclosing to Public, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2018), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/google-exposed-user-data-feared-repercussions-
of-disclosing-to-public-1539017194; Lily Hay Newman, A New Google+ Blun-
der Exposed Data From 52.5 Million Users, WIRED (Dec. 10, 2018, 2:19 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/story/google-plus-bug-52-million-users-data-exposed/. 
 104 MacMillan & McMillan, supra note 103. 
 105 Id. 
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way, technology companies have gone beyond their roles as search 
engine service providers and social media outlets. Rather, they are 
shrewdly run billion-dollar corporations depending heavily on ad-
vertising. For instance, in 2018, Facebook made more than $50 bil-
lion in advertising revenue; 98.5% of its total revenue.106 Targeted 
advertisements are specifically transmitted to individuals by utiliz-
ing personal data collected by technology companies routinely and 
without the targets’ consent.107 How much a technology company 
knows about an individual will determine how much money it can 
make.108 
Before the overhaul of the U.S. tax system in 2017, a federal 
corporate income tax was imposed on U.S. companies at a rate of 
35% of their worldwide profits.109 However, companies could in-
definitely defer payment of taxes on profits earned abroad as long 
as these profits were retained offshore.110 The difference in tax rates 
between the United States and overseas jurisdictions incentivized 
many U.S.-based multinational companies to adjust their corporate 
structures to enjoy the tax benefits. 
Apple, for example, took advantage of such a tax gap between 
United States and offshore jurisdictions. It transferred large amounts 
of its profits to offshore subsidiaries in tax havens such as Ireland 
and the Channel Island of Jersey to avoid tens of billions of dollars 
in U.S. taxes.111 In 2016, the European Commission found that Ire-
 
 106 Matthew Johnston, How Facebook Makes Money: Advertising Dominates 
Revenue, but Growth Is Slowing, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.in-
vestopedia.com/ask/answers/120114/how-does-facebook-fb-make-money.asp 
(last updated Jan. 12, 2020). 
 107 See Louise Matsakis, Facebook’s Targeted Ads Are More Complex than It 
Lets On, WIRED (Apr. 25, 2018, 4:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/face-
books-targeted-ads-are-more-complex-than-it-lets-on/. 
 108 Joanna Glasner, What Search Sites Know About You, WIRED (Apr. 5, 
2005, 2:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2005/04/what-search-sites-know-
about-you/. 
 109 Jesse Drucker, How Tax Bills Would Reward Companies That Moved 
Money Offshore, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/11/29/business/taxes-offshore-repatriation.html. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Jesse Drucker & Simon Bowers, The Paradise Papers: After a Tax Crack-
down, Apple Found a New Shelter for Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/06/world/apple-taxes-jersey.html. 
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land gave illegal state aid to Apple by levying lower than 1% effec-
tive corporate tax on Apple, where the prevailing Irish corporate tax 
rate was 12.5%.112 Apple saved €13 billion in taxes because of the 
aid.113 
Congress enacted the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act in 2017.114 The Act 
reduces the tax rate on money repatriated to the United States from 
35% to 15.5%.115 Amazon has been a beneficiary of the tax cuts.116 
Although it earned more than $11 billion in profits in 2018, it paid 
zero federal corporate income tax owing to the reduction in tax rates 
for corporations, carry-forward losses from previous years, R&D tax 
credit and stock-based employee compensation. 117  Furthermore, 
Amazon received a $129 million federal income tax rebate, which 
made its tax rate -1%.118 
II. JUSTIFYING THE THREE FUNDAMENTAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
How should we deal with irresponsible technology companies? 
Statutes and regulatory measures were adopted largely on the as-
sumption that these companies, in the startup stage, had little finan-
cial capacity and that minimizing their responsibilities would incen-
tivize the development of innovative services and products. How-
ever, as discussed in the Introduction, the situation is now drastically 
 
 112 David Meyer, Apple Has Paid the $14.3 Billion It Owes the Irish Tax Au-
thorities—But the Check Hasn’t Cleared Yet, FORTUNE (Sept. 19, 2018, 5:58 
AM), https://fortune.com/2018/09/19/apple-ireland-tax-payments-escrow. 
 113 Ireland Forced to Collect Apple’s Disputed €13Bn Tax Bill, BBC (Dec. 5, 
2017), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-42237312. 
 114 Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (codified 
as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2018)). 
 115 What’s in the Final Republican Tax Bill, REUTERS (Dec. 20, 2017, 11:43 
AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-tax-provisions-factbox/whats-in-
the-final-republican-tax-bill-idUSKBN1ED27K. 
 116 Andrew Davis, Why Amazon Paid No 2018 US Federal Income Tax, 
CNBC (Apr. 4, 2019, 6:10 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/04/03/why-ama-
zon-paid-no-federal-income-tax.html. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Laura Stampler, Amazon Will Pay a Whopping $0 in Federal Taxes on 
$11.2 Billion Profits, FORTUNE (Feb. 14, 2019, 3:34 PM), https://for-
tune.com/2019/02/14/amazon-doesnt-pay-federal-taxes-2019. 
2020] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW 923 
 
different. As beneficiaries of those lax statutory and regulatory ar-
rangements, the major technology companies are now among the 
richest and most sophisticated in the world. 
It is high time to redefine the nature and scope of technology 
companies’ responsibilities. Drawing on the ethical theories of rec-
iprocity, role responsibility, and social justice, I discuss how and 
why three corporate fundamental responsibilities should be imposed 
upon technology companies: reciprocating users’ contributions, 
playing roles positively, and confronting injustices created by tech-
nological development. 
A. The Responsibility to Reciprocate 
1. RECIPROCITY 
As an ethical norm, reciprocity requires that one should respond 
to a positive action from another by returning proportionately his or 
her positive action.119 Aristotle used friendship, one of the most basic 
human relationships, to illustrate the importance of reciprocity. Ac-
cording to him, positive friendship is a relationship in which two per-
sons treat each other as equals and are willing to reciprocate each 
other’s admiration and good deeds.120 By contrast, negative friend-
ship develops without the intention to reciprocate because the two 
persons only care about their own utility or pleasure.121 Central to rec-
iprocity, therefore, is that people must assume responsibility to take 
positive action in return for others’ kindness.122 Cicero regarded this 
 
 119 See LAWRENCE C. BECKER, RECIPROCITY 3 (1986). Conversely, reciproc-
ity also allows one to respond to a negative action from another—such as a harm-
ful or hurtful action—with indifference or retaliation. Id.; see also FRANCIS 
FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY 11 
(1995) (“Law, contract, and economic rationality . . . must as well be leavened 
with reciprocity, moral obligation, duty toward community, and trust . . . . The 
latter are not anachronisms in a modern society but rather the sine qua non of the 
latter’s success.”). 
 120 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VIII, at 147, 149 (Roger Crisp ed. 
& trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2000) (c. 384 B.C.E.) (“It is bad people who will 
tend to be friends for pleasure or utility . . . . But good people will be friends for 
each other’s sake . . . .”). 
 121 Id. at 149. 
 122 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE 
CAPABILITIES APPROACH 72 (2000) (“The core idea of [human nature] is that of 
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as the bedrock of all ethical norms, emphasizing that “there is no more 
essential duty than that of returning kindness received; to omit the 
returning of kindness is impossible for a good man.”123 
Reciprocity is universally accepted and practiced because of its 
intrinsic value in stabilizing interpersonal relationships and societal 
institutions.124 The ethos of reciprocity requires the recipient of a pos-
itive action to overcome his or her selfish impulses and consider how 
he or she could act in return in another’s interest.125 Therefore, it pro-
vides the original positive actor with the expectation that kindness 
will ultimately be responded to positively.126 Through the repetition 
of reciprocal actions, people become more willing to initiate positive 
deeds for others and respond to others’ positive deeds.127 
Reciprocity involves two specific responsibilities. First, people 
have the responsibility to appreciate positive actions done by others 
for them.128 They should be willing to recognize benefits received and 
identify ways in which those benefits have promoted their well-being. 
This process of appreciation motivates one to take reciprocal action. 
Indifference to others’ positive actions will preclude any possibility 
of reflecting on the positive consequences of those actions. 
Second, people have the responsibility to act in return for benefits 
received as a result of others’ actions. Central to “[r]eciprocity is a 
moral idea situated between impartiality, which is altruistic, on the 
one side and mutual advantage on the other.”129 Reciprocation may 
 
the human being as a dignified free being who shapes his or her own life in cooper-
ation and reciprocity with others, rather than being passively shaped or pushed 
around by the world in the manner of a ‘flock’ or ‘herd’ animal.”). 
 123 Marcus Tullius Cicero, De Officiis, in ETHICAL WRITINGS OF CICERO 32 
(Andrew P. Peabody, trans., 1887). 
 124 See Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary State-
ment, 25 AM. SOC. REV. 161, 171–76 (1960); see DAVID SCHMIDTZ, THE 
ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 79 (2006) (arguing that reciprocity induces cooperation 
and “enables people to live together in mutually respectful peace”). 
 125 See, e.g., Gouldner, supra note 124, at 170. 
 126 Id. 
 127 See GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 387 (Kurt H. 
Wolff ed. & trans., The Free Press 1950) (concluding that social equilibrium and 
cohesion only exist because of “the reciprocity of service and return service”). 
 128 See, e.g., SCHMIDTZ, supra note 124, at 76 (“The art of reciprocity is partly 
an art of graciously acknowledging favors.”). 
 129 JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 77 (Erin Kelly ed., 
2001). 
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apply a mathematical formula, for example, in the case of a party who 
must pay off a specific amount of debt owed to the other party ac-
cording to the contract between them.130 More frequently, reciproca-
tion takes the form of actions such as expressing appreciation verbally 
or in writing, or providing assistance or care.131 
2. RECIPROCITY AND TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 
How should technology companies deal with the ethics of reci-
procity? In this Section, I identify how users of technology compa-
nies’ services have contributed to technology companies’ market suc-
cesses. I further argue that technology companies should take the re-
sponsibility to first appreciate users’ contributions and then to con-
sider how they should reciprocate by proactively protecting users’ in-
terests.  
First, users have created a vast array of content, which has con-
tributed immensely to the rapid development and success of social 
media platforms. As of January 2019, the number of active social 
media users had reached 3.48 billion.132 A statistics report shows 
that Facebook users posted 510,000 comments, updated 293,000 
user statuses, and uploaded 136,000 photos every minute in January 
 
 130 See SIMMEL, supra note 127, at 387 (commenting that “[a]ll contacts 
among men rest on the schema of giving and returning the equivalence”). 
 131 See, e.g., IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 30 (2000) 
(“The conditions of equal opportunity to speak and freedom from domination en-
courage all to express their needs and interests. The equality condition also re-
quires a reciprocity such that each acknowledges that the interests of the others 
must be taken into account in order to reach a judgement.”). 
 132 SIMON KEMP, DIGITAL 2019: ESSENTIAL INSIGHTS INTO HOW PEOPLE 
AROUND THE WORLD USE THE INTERNET, MOBILE DEVICES, SOCIAL MEDIA, AND 
E-COMMERCE 7 (2019), https://p.widencdn.net/kqy7ii/Digital2019-Report-en. 
Facebook monthly active users have increased from 100 million in the third quar-
ter of 2008 to 2.45 billion in the third quarter of 2019. J. Clement, Number of 
Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 3rd Quarter 2019 (in Millions), 
STATISTA (Nov. 19, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/number-
of-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide. In December 2010, the number of 
active monthly users of Instagram was 1 million; as of June 2018, it was 1 billion. 
Josh Constine, Instagram Hits 1 Billion Monthly Users, Up From 800M in Sep-
tember, TECHCRUNCH (June 20, 2018, 1:58 PM), 
https://techcrunch.com/2018/06/20/instagram-1-billion-users. 
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2020.133 As of May 2019, YouTube’s two billion monthly active us-
ers134 had uploaded more than 500 hours of video per minute.135 
Second, users have contributed substantially to technology com-
panies’ advertising revenues. Advertising has become the major 
source of revenue for many of these companies.136 It was reported 
that Internet advertising revenues in the United States increased to 
$107.5 billion in 2018.137 Facebook’s advertising revenue nearly 
doubled from $8.63 billion for the fourth quarter of 2016 to $16.64 
billion for the fourth quarter of 2018. 138  Ostensibly, advertisers 
choose social media outlets as the major advertising platforms be-
cause of the size of the audience they offer.139 
Third, users contribute positively to technology companies’ in-
novation capacities. For example, AI-powered applications require 
a vast amount of training data for their development. Apart from 
 
 133 Dan Noyes, The Top 20 Valuable Facebook Statistics, ZEPHORIA, 
https://zephoria.com/top-15-valuable-facebook-statistics (last updated Jan. 2020). 
As of June 2016, Instagram users were contributing 95 million posts every day. 
Yasmeen Abutaleb, Instagram’s User Base Grows to More Than 500 Million, 
REUTERS (June 21, 2016, 9:09 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-face-
book-instagram-users/instagrams-user-base-grows-to-more-than-500-million-
idUSKCN0Z71LN. 
 134 Adam Warner, Which Social Media Platform Has the Most Users? [2020 
DISCUSSION], WEBSITE PLANET, https://www.websiteplanet.com/blog/social-
media-platform-users (last visited Jan. 19, 2020). 
 135 James Hale, More Than 500 Hours of Content Are Now Being Uploaded 
to YouTube Every Minute, TUBEFILTER (May 7, 2019), https://www.tubefil-
ter.com/2019/05/07/number-hours-video-uploaded-to-youtube-per-minute. 
 136 See BARTLETT, supra note 7, at 12. 
 137 See PwC, IAB INTERNET ADVERTISING REVENUE REPORT: 2018 FULL 
RESULTS 2 (2019), https://www.iab.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/Full-Year-
2018-IAB-Internet-Advertising-Revenue-Report.pdf. 
 138 Amy Gesenhues, Facebook Ad Revenue Tops $16.6 billion, Driven by In-
stagram, Stories, MARTECH TODAY (Jan. 31, 2019, 12:20 PM), https://martech-
today.com/despite-ongoing-criticism-facebook-generates-16-6-billion-in-ad-rev-
enue-during-q4-up-30-yoy-230261. In 2016, Instagram earned $1.61 billion from 
advertising in the United States; in 2018 this rose to $6.18 billion. Blake Droesch, 
Instagram’s New Explore Ads Signal Potential Changes to Organic Reach, 
EMARKETER (July 9, 2019), https://www.emarketer.com/content/instagrams-
new-explore-ads-signal-potential-changes-to-organic-reach. 
 139 See KEITH A. QUESENBERRY, SOCIAL MEDIA STRATEGY: MARKETING, 
ADVERTISING, AND PUBLIC RELATIONS IN THE CONSUMER REVOLUTION 8–9 
(2015) (discussing that social media operates in user-centric modes and its pro-
found influence over users). 
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training datasets purchased from data brokers, training data can also 
be amassed from the Internet.140 Therefore, users’ activities on the 
Internet generate a huge amount of data that is useful for the training 
and development of AI. In late 2015, Google rolled out its Inbox 
Smart Reply feature providing automatic email response sugges-
tions.141 Smart Reply used AI to read incoming emails, understand 
the content, and then automatically generate up to three responses 
from which users could select.142 The Smart Reply algorithm was 
trained on a corpus of 238 million email messages.143 These email 
messages were presumably sourced from Gmail accounts.144 
Similarly, facial recognition technologies take advantage of im-
ages contributed by users.145 The photos that people store and share 
on social media platforms and image hosting sites provide face im-
age data for computers to recognize, identify, and analyze faces. 
When users tag friends in photos, these labeled faces can be used to 
train facial recognition AI. For example, Facebook used 4.4 million 
images of labelled faces of more than 4000 individuals to develop 
its facial recognition technology known as DeepFace.146 IBM ex-
tracted nearly a million photos from a dataset of the image hosting 
site Flickr for its facial recognition project.147 
 
 140 See, e.g., James Vincent, Google is Testing a New Way of Training its AI 
Algorithms Directly on Your Phone, THE VERGE (Apr. 10, 2017, 6:38 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2017/4/10/15241492/google-ai-user-data-federated-
learning. 
 141 Arjun Kharpal, Google’s New Feature Will Reply to Emails for You, 
CNBC (Nov. 3, 2015, 12:07 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2015/11/03/google-ma-
chine-learning-reply-emails-gmail.html. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Anjuli Kannan et al., Smart Reply: Automated Response Suggestion for 
Email, KDD’16: PROC. 22ND ACM SIGKDD INT’L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE 
DISCOVERY & DATA MINING, Aug. 2016, at 955, 962. 
 144 Id. 
 145 See FERNANDO IAFRATE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND BIG DATA: THE 
BIRTH OF A NEW INTELLIGENCE 48 (2018). 
 146 Yaniv Taigman et al., DeepFace: Closing the Gap to Human-Level Per-
formance in Face Verification, in 2014 IEEE CONFERENCE ON COMPUTER VISION 
AND PATTERN RECOGNITION 1701, 1705 (2014). 
 147 Emily Price, Millions of Flickr Photos Were Scraped to Train Facial 
Recognition Software, FORTUNE (Mar. 12, 2019, 4:01 PM), https://for-
tune.com/2019/03/12/millions-of-flickr-photos-were-scraped-to-train-facial-
recognition-software. 
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Despite these user contributions, managers of technology com-
panies may still argue that their companies have no responsibility to 
reciprocate. They may argue that their companies have already made 
contributions to users by initiating their platform services or tech-
nologies providing users with new experiences. Alternatively, these 
managers may contend that their companies fulfill their responsibil-
ity to reciprocate by upgrading regularly the quality of their plat-
forms and technologies, thereby improving user experiences.  
These arguments unduly downplay user contributions. Most 
technology companies are very different from conventional compa-
nies that manufacture and sell products such as food and clothing or 
offer services such as catering and transportation. Conventional 
companies serve passive users who pay to consume products or ser-
vices rather than engaging in the production of products and the pro-
vision of services. Therefore, these companies thrive primarily on 
their own efforts.  
By contrast, many technology companies thrive both on their 
own efforts and the contributions of their users. These active users 
play an indispensable role in the growth of these companies, because 
they directly or indirectly engage themselves in the development of 
online platforms and data-driven technologies.  As discussed earlier 
in this Section, users actively post, upload, and update content on 
social media platforms and provide personal data such as addresses 
and preferences that are shared with other online platforms such as 
Amazon. Users have also contributed a vast amount of information 
and images for the development of technologies such as AI and fa-
cial recognition. 
Hence, technology companies ought to take seriously their re-
sponsibility to reciprocate users’ contributions. No matter how fi-
nancially successful and politically powerful they are,148 they ought 
to appreciate these contributions, carefully considering the extent to 
which the content and data contributed by users has played a posi-
tive role in their corporate development. Beyond this, they ought to 
consider what actions they can take to reciprocate.  
 
 148 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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B. The Responsibility to Play Roles Positively 
1. ROLE RESPONSIBILITY 
While reciprocity-based responsibility is triggered by the positive 
deeds of others, role responsibility is ascribed to individuals or insti-
tutions if they themselves have spontaneously assumed certain roles 
in personal or social activities. As another ethical norm, role respon-
sibility requires individuals to take responsibility for the specific roles 
they choose to adopt by themselves.  H. L. A. Hart justifies role re-
sponsibility as follows: 
[a] sea captain is responsible for the safety of his 
ship, and that is his responsibility, or one of his re-
sponsibilities. A husband is responsible for the 
maintenance of his wife; parents for the upbringing 
of their children; . . . a clerk for keeping the accounts 
of his firm. These examples of a person’s responsi-
bilities suggest the generalization that, whenever a 
person occupies a distinctive place or office in a so-
cial organization, to which specific duties are at-
tached to provide for the welfare of others or to ad-
vance in some specific way the aims or purposes of 
the organization, he is properly said to be responsible 
for the performance of these duties, or for doing what 
is necessary to fulfil them. Such duties are a person’s 
responsibilities.149 
Responsibility, as the above justification shows, could be im-
posed on a person based on a specific role he or she plays. An indi-
vidual occupies a certain official role such as a sea captain, a husband, 
or a clerk. These interpersonal roles put the individual in a special 
position in relation to others whose interests would be affected, as-
signing him or her certain functions to perform or goals to fulfill.150 
 
 149 H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 212 (2d ed. 2008). 
 150 See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL 
THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 38 (1986) (arguing that “at any given point 
in time and within a particular normative scheme, organizational behavior is ame-
nable to analysis and interpretation in terms of the organization’s instrumental 
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In this context, expectations are cast upon such an individual to take 
responsibilities to perform functions or fulfill goals attached to his or 
her role.151 
Role responsibility leads to two kinds of responsibilities in prac-
tice. First, personal responsibilities are attached to specific roles, such 
as husband, wife, father, and mother, on the basis of intimate relation-
ships that form small-scale institutions such as family and marriage.  
Second, professional responsibilities arise from the specific roles in-
dividuals choose to serve in larger institutions such as companies and 
governmental agencies. Once an individual chooses a profession that 
confers upon him or her the authority to control people and resources, 
certain responsibilities are then imposed on him or her within the 
bounds of the profession.152  
Compared with personal responsibilities, professional responsi-
bilities trigger accountability toward more people whose interests 
may be affected either directly or indirectly. For instance, a sea cap-
tain, as Hart points out, is responsible for the safety of the ship for the 
sake of its passengers. Following the ethos of role responsibility, the 
captain is supposed to exercise due care and take prudent measures 
throughout the journey.153 A judge serving on the bench is responsi-
ble for the impartial adjudication of a given case.154 Therefore, he or 
 
nature, that is, in terms of its pursuit of some predetermined individual or social 
goals”). 
 151 See Robin Zheng, What is My Role in Changing the System? A New Model 
of Responsibility for Structural Injustice, 21 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 
869, 875 (2018) (“Performing a role . . . is an ongoing process of making infinitely 
many tiny decisions about how to perform it, thereby calibrating one’s behavior 
with another’s expectations and behavior at the same time that the other is cali-
brating their expectations and behavior with yours.”) (emphasis in original). 
 152 See Peter Cane, Role Responsibility, 20 J. ETHICS 279, 285 (2016) 
(“[A]person in authority may, in fact, be (or have been) capable of controlling the 
people and events complained of; and if the authority should have exercised con-
trol, this may provide a basis for imposing personal responsibility on the authority 
for what occurred. However, regardless of capacity to control, the authority may 
be role-responsible simply by virtue of the authority.”). 
 153 HART, supra note 149, at 212. 
 154 See, e.g., Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. 
L. REV. 353, 354 (1978) (“From this office certain requirements might be de-
duced, for example, that of impartiality, since a judge to be ‘truly’ such must be 
impartial. Then, as the next step, if he is to be impartial he must be willing to hear 
both sides, etc.”). 
2020] UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW 931 
 
she must to make every effort to fulfill this role responsibility, deliv-
ering a properly-reasoned judicial decision for the parties involved.155 
Moreover, while personal responsibilities privately serve only the 
interests of individuals in intimate relationships, professional respon-
sibilities affect societal interests at large in the short and long term. 
For example, if most judges in a country were corrupt, their biased 
ruling of, or meddling in, individual cases would ultimately under-
mine the societal interest of maintaining the rule of law. Similarly, if 
environmental regulators failed to take proactive actions to prevent 
certain factories from polluting the air or water, this failure would ul-
timately erode the societal interest of environmental protection. If leg-
islators took bribes from a food company to push for the passage of a 
new food law relaxing safety standards, the societal interest of ensur-
ing food safety would be jeopardized. These instances show that so-
cial roles require those who hold them to make prudent decisions in 
the public interest rather than in favor of any particular person or 
group.156 
Central to the fulfilment of role responsibility is the ability to en-
gage in ethical deliberation. Hart emphasizes this deliberative func-
tion, pointing out that “[a] responsible person is one who is disposed 
to take his duties seriously; to think about them, and to make serious 
efforts to fulfil them. To behave responsibly is to behave as a man 
would who took his duties in this serious way.”157 
There are two key steps in conducting this ethical deliberation 
with regards to role responsibility.158 First, individuals in specific per-
sonal or professional roles must learn to consider the private or soci-
etal interests that might be affected by their performance of the role. 
 
 155 Id. 
 156 See, e.g., JUSTIN OAKLEY & DEAN COCKING, VIRTUE ETHICS AND 
PROFESSIONAL ROLES 118 (2001) (arguing that “if health and justice are taken as 
the appropriate ends of the medical and legal professions, respectively, then the 
proper roles and dispositions of doctors and lawyers will be determined according 
to how well those roles and dispositions serve health or justice, respectively.”). 
 157 HART, supra note 149, at 213. 
 158 See Sun, Copyright, supra note 64, at 292–93 (discussing the role of moral 
deliberation). 
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For instance, doctors should be aware of their responsibilities to re-
ceive adequate medical ethics education.159 This is because their fail-
ure to do so would negatively affect their capacity to tackle medical 
problems and protect patients’ interests in health. Second, those indi-
viduals must prudently consider how they should perform their per-
sonal or professional roles so as to promote the private or societal in-
terests identified in the first step.160 This process normally requires 
“care and attention over a protracted period of time.”161 Failure to 
meet their role responsibilities would trigger legal liabilities or moral 
blame.162 
2. TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES’ ROLE RESPONSIBILITIES 
In this Section, I examine the important professional roles that 
technology companies play as information disseminators, collec-
tors, and/or creators. Following the theory of role responsibility, I 
argue that their managers should consider how the companies can 
play these roles positively. 
Technology companies such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, 
and YouTube act as information disseminators by operating social 
media platforms.163 These companies help disseminate all variety of 
information, including e-commerce data, entertainment updates, and 
news.164 Compared with conventional media outlets, social media 
platforms have three major advantages in disseminating infor-
mation.  
First, social media platforms allow users to disseminate infor-
mation with unprecedented ease. As long as users are connected to 
 
 159 See ARISTOTLE, supra note 120, at 3 (pointing out that “the end of [the 
medical art] is health”). 
 160 See, e.g., OAKLEY & COCKING, supra note 156, at 74 (arguing that “a pro-
fessional role is . . . importantly determined by how well that role functions in 
serving the goals of the profession, and by how those goals are connected with 
characteristic human activities”). 
 161 HART, supra note 149, at 213. 
 162 Id. at 215–22. 
 163 See, e.g., Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, The Rise of Social Media, OUR WORLD 
DATA (Sept. 18, 2019), https://ourworldindata.org/rise-of-social-media (reporting 
that Facebook has 2.4 billion users of the 3.5 billion people online). 
 164 Jenny Force, How Social Media Continues to Affect Society, SYSOMOS 
(Aug. 23, 2016), https://sysomos.com/2016/08/23/how-social-media-continues-
to-affect-society/. 
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the Internet, they can upload content to a platform whenever and 
wherever they wish.165 Moreover, technology companies equip so-
cial media platforms with enhanced communication functionalities 
such as private messaging, voice calls, voice messages, and video 
calling. These functionalities have made social connection much 
more convenient, which in turn accelerates transmission of infor-
mation.  
Second, social media platforms offer unprecedented network ef-
fects in disseminating information by significantly amplifying the 
number of users who view or use information.166 By increasing the 
ease of information access and dissemination and providing their 
services for free or at a low charge, social media platforms can build 
and expand their user base. Facebook, WeChat, and other platforms 
offer an extensive range of interactive functionalities allowing com-
mercial entities to disseminate business information to an entire or 
partial network of users.167 
Third, social media platforms have also facilitated the democra-
tization of information dissemination. Traditional media outlets re-
quire content producers to conform to and gain acceptance from the 
established infrastructure. Within the traditional media, one must 
become a television anchor or journalist if one wishes to deliver 
news. Social media platforms have removed such barriers, allowing 
anyone to create content and disseminate it directly to the world.168 
By providing a direct communication channel to individuals, social 
media platforms have arguably helped humanity capitalize on soci-
ety’s previously untapped human capital and talent. Naturally, as 
talented personalities are discovered, the influence and importance 
 
 165 SAM HINTON & LARISSA HJORTH, UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL MEDIA 32 
(2013). 
 166 See Amitai Aviram, Regulation by Networks, 2003 BYU L. REV. 1179, 
1195 (2003). 
 167 See Alex Gray, Here's the Secret to How WeChat Attracts 1 Billion 
Monthly Users, WORLD ECON. F. (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.wefo-
rum.org/agenda/2018/03/wechat-now-has-over-1-billion-monthly-users/. 
 168 See, e.g., Alfred Hermida, Social Journalism: Exploring How Social Me-
dia is Shaping Journalism, in THE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL ONLINE JOURNALISM 
312 (Eugenia Siapera & Andreas Veglis eds., 2012) (“[D]igital technologies are 
empowering more users to participate in more ways in the creation of media.”). 
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of the platform they inhabit also grows. To use revenue as an indi-
cator, in 2017, YouTube’s revenue ($7.8 billion)169 was more than 
quadruple that of the New York Times ($1.7 billion).170 
Technology companies also act as information collectors. They 
collect data about consumers through their shopping activities, com-
munications, social media activities, and so on.171 They analyze and 
then utilize data sets on consumer locations, behaviors, preferences, 
and characteristics in their corporate interests for a variety of pur-
poses. These may range from enhancing security or facilitating the 
effective dissemination of advertisements on their platforms to de-
veloping technologies such as AI and facial recognition.172 Technol-
ogy companies may also collect data for sale to other parties, such 
as consumer scoring companies or credit rating agencies.    
Moreover, technology companies act as information creators by 
generating new intellectual properties. In 2019, the top fifty recipi-
ents of registered patents were all technology companies. IBM 
topped this ranking with 9,262 patent applications approved by the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.173 For many researchers, tech-
nology companies provide the means to create, operationalize, and 
commercialize their inventions. Therefore, they are willing to sign 
employee contracts that grant ownership of their employment-re-
lated inventions to the company.  
Technology companies fare so well as innovative information 
creators because they meet the three crucial factors required for in-
novation: (1) a recognized need, (2) competent people with relevant 
technology, and (3) financial support. 174  Technology companies 
 
 169 J. Clement, Worldwide Net Advertising Revenues of YouTube from 2016 to 
2020 (in Billion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA (May 7, 2019), https://www.sta-
tista.com/statistics/289658/youtube-global-net-advertising-revenues/. 
 170 New York Times Revenue 2006-2019, MACROTRENDS https://www.macro-
trends.net/stocks/charts/NYT/new-york-times/revenue (last visited Jan. 20, 
2020). 
 171 Balkin, Free Speech in the Algorithmic Society, supra note 38, at 1156 
(“Big Data collects and analyzes information about people — their locations, ac-
tions, characteristics, and behaviors.”). 
 172 See supra notes 132–147 and accompanying text. 
 173 IFI CLAIMS Patent Services, 2019 Top 50 US Patent Assignees, 
https://www.ificlaims.com/rankings-top-50-2019.htm (last updated Jan. 8, 2020). 
 174 See Barishnikova O.E. & Nevzorova M.N., Development of Innovation, 6 
EUR. J. NAT. HIST. 53, 53 (2015). 
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have departments associated with each factor. The “need” in the 
case of technology companies refers to consumer needs, prefer-
ences, and desires, and market research personnel in a technology 
company are specialized in discovering these unmet needs of the 
market. The research and development department is made up of 
people familiar with existing relevant technologies who are able to 
create new technologies according to specifications discovered by 
the market research team. Financial support for the project is se-
cured by the finance department. 
Pursuant to the ethos of role responsibility, technology compa-
nies should play their professional roles as information dissemina-
tors, collectors, and creators positively. First, they should adequately 
consider how these roles would affect their users’ private interests, 
as well as societal interests. Second, they should take actions that 
are reasonably necessary to protect these interests. Failure to do ei-
ther should subject them to legal penalties or moral blame.  
Akin to the information fiduciary approach suggested by Profes-
sor Jack Balkin,175 the ethos of role responsibility supports the im-
position of fiduciary duties upon technology company managers. 
Acting as information collectors, they should have a fiduciary duty 
to protect their users’ private interests in personal data. Both ap-
proaches require managers of technology companies to take action 
to fulfill these duties of their own volition and based upon their eth-
ical deliberation. As Professor Jonathan Zittrain observes, the infor-
mation fiduciary approach “protects consumers and corrects a clear 
market failure without the need for heavy-handed government inter-
vention.”176 The role responsibility approach, however, draws on a 
different ethical theory and could address two theoretical and prac-
tical problems with the information fiduciary approach.  
First, the information fiduciary approach does not tackle the po-
tential conflict between managers’ duty to protect users’ interests in 
 
 175 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  
 176 Jonathan Zittrain, How to Exercise the Power You Didn’t Ask For, HARV. 
BUS. REV.: BIG IDEA (Sept. 19, 2018), https:// hbr.org/2018/09/how-to-exercise-
the-power-you-didnt-ask-for. 
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personal data and their duty to maximize their shareholders’ inter-
ests.177 Such conflicts abound in reality. Technology companies’ fi-
duciary duty to use personal data with due care conflicts with their 
motive to further their corporate interests in earning profits by host-
ing advertisements or selling data sets to other parties. How can the 
information fiduciary approach win the hearts and minds of manag-
ers hired to serve shareholders’ interests?  
The role responsibility approach has the potential to address this 
problem by integrating role responsibility into the corporate deci-
sion-making process. It reimagines technology companies as social 
enterprises that prioritize serving their users’ private interests and 
societal interests at large while promoting their shareholders’ inter-
ests as a secondary consideration. This approach still allows manag-
ers of technology companies to pursue the maximization of share-
holder value, so long as it does not conflict with the company’s pri-
orities in serving users’ private interests and those of society. From 
this perspective, role responsibility requires managers to adequately 
consider how their corporate operations would affect these interests 
as part of their initial decision-making process.178 Moreover, tech-
nology companies’ responsibility to reciprocate users’ contributions 
reinforces this role responsibility, because it also requires managers 
to take action to protect users’ interests.    
 Second, the information fiduciary approach only deals with 
technology companies’ role as information collectors, not as infor-
mation disseminators and creators. The protection of personal data 
is indeed crucially important, given the prevalence of data breaches. 
However, as this Section has shown, the roles of information dis-
seminators and creators are also of crucial importance to individual 
users and society at large. They affect the flow of information, reg-
 
 177 See Khan & Pozen, supra note 40, at 506 (suggesting that the information 
fiduciary approach “would also pose a threat to Facebook’s bottom line and there-
fore to the interest of shareholders”). 
 178 See Erika George, Corporate Social Responsibility and Social Media Cor-
porations: Incorporating Human Rights Through Rankings, Self-Regulation and 
Shareholder Resolutions, 28 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 521, 524 (2018) (“Given 
the power and influence of private corporations to create platforms used by mem-
bers of the public who share news, ideas, and often even personal information, it 
is important to better understand the ways in which human rights issues implicated 
by the policies and practices of social media companies.”). 
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ulation of speech, and innovation. In contrast to the information fi-
duciary approach, role responsibility does not single out the infor-
mation collector role. Rather, it integrates the three roles and shapes 
them as the functions that technology companies must serve as so-
cial enterprises. It then requires technology companies to take 
broader strategies to fulfill their responsibilities arising from these 
three roles. Under this approach, if a technology company takes its 
information disseminator and creator roles seriously and fulfills its 
corresponding responsibilities well, it should put itself in a very 
good position to perform its information collector role while pro-
tecting personal data.  
C. The Responsibility to Confront Injustices Created by 
Technological Development 
1. SOCIAL JUSTICE 
All human beings are equal in dignity and freedom, and this sta-
tus is legally recognized in both international human rights treaties 
and national constitutions.179 However, injustice is a part of every 
society. The unjust distribution of social resources that leads to in-
come disparities continues to get worse.180 Status injustices caused 
by racial, gender, and sexuality discrimination still exist in the 
United States and in many other countries. 
Against this backdrop, social justice is widely regarded as a fun-
damental value intended to minimize the impact of unequal distri-
bution of resources and status discrimination. For example, leading 
 
 179 For example, Article 1 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
states that, “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They 
are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a 
spirit of brotherhood.” G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, art. 1 (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 180 See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
430–32 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014) (surveying the growing inequality in 
distribution of resources); Ilyana Kuziemko & Stefanie Stantcheva, Our Feelings 
About Inequality: It’s Complicated N.Y. TIMES: OPINIONATOR (Apr. 21, 2013, 
8:45 PM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/21/our-feelings-about-
inequality-its-complicated/ (“Since the 1970s, income inequality in the United 
States has increased at a historic rate. In 1970, the richest 1 percent of Americans 
enjoyed 9 percent of total national pre-tax income. In 2011, by contrast, that share 
had risen to 19.8 percent.”). 
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philosopher John Rawls has elevated social justice to the status of 
the “first virtue of social institutions.”181 
Social justice, by nature, centers on how to allocate responsibil-
ities for distributing resources and social statuses. From this per-
spective, Rawls captures the essence of a responsibility-based no-
tion of social justice as follows: 
[t]his conception [of social justice] includes what we 
may call a social division of responsibility: society, 
the citizens as a collective body, accepts the respon-
sibility for maintaining the equal basic liberties and 
fair equality of opportunity, and for providing a fair 
share of the other primary goods for everyone within 
this framework, while citizens (as individuals) and 
associations accept the responsibility for revising 
and adjusting their ends and aspirations in view of 
the all-purpose means they can expect, given their 
present and foreseeable situation.182 
This statement shows that central to social justice is the distribu-
tion of responsibilities among citizens. Thus, Rawls further argues 
that “the principles of social justice . . . provide a way of assigning 
rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and they define 
the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social co-
operation.”183 
The responsibility to promote social justice, in my opinion, in-
volves tackling three forms of injustice: privatization-driven injus-
tice, technology-driven injustice, and identity-driven injustice. The 
third form of injustice typically classifies people on the basis of race, 
gender, and/or sexuality, causing discriminatory harm to them. In 
the discussion that follows, I discuss only the first two forms of in-
justice. 
 
 181 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1999) 
[hereinafter RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE]. Rawls also points out that “[a] theory 
however elegant and economical must be rejected or revised if it is untrue; like-
wise laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be re-
formed or abolished if they are unjust.” Id. 
 182 JOHN RAWLS, Social Unity and Primary Goods, in COLLECTED PAPERS 
359, 371 (Samuel Freeman ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (emphasis added). 
 183 RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 181, at 4. 
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The responsibility to counter privatization-driven injustice 
arises because it causes structural maldistribution of social re-
sources.184 Although the free market allows voluntary transactions 
of private property, it is still fraught with injustice due to the coer-
cive power embedded in larger social structures.185 Unequal distri-
bution of private property is a fundamental source of coercive power 
in the marketplace. This power is not defensive, but offensive. It is 
not a means of shielding the property owner from unwarranted in-
terference from others or the state, but the legal basis for coercing 
others to do things that the property owner wishes.186 
Thus, the free market is by no means free of coercion. Rather, 
property-based coercive power is arguably intrinsic in the market-
place. From this perspective, effective distributional policies should 
require an analysis of how the legal system allocates coercive 
power. For instance, the rationale against expansive privatization of 
natural resources by and large stems from the fact that the free mar-
ket, despite its liberty-promoting function, results in coercion by 
creating monopolization of resources.187 In a modern society, it is 
inevitable that every person is involved in the trade that takes place 
in the marketplace. While every person has an equal nominal status 
as a trading participant, the type or amount of resources that he or 
she controls in fact differs from one person to another. Therefore, 
bargaining power when negotiating deals in the marketplace always 
varies from person to person, making it possible that people with 
stronger bargaining power can coerce others into following their 
commands.188  
 
 184 See IRIS MARION YOUNG, RESPONSIBILITY FOR JUSTICE 45 (2011). 
 185 See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coer-
cive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470, 470 (1923). 
 186 Id. at 472. 
 187 See, e.g., David Brodwin, The Tragedy of Privatizing the Commons: Why 
Privatizing Our Shared Resources Doesn’t Work., U.S. NEWS (Mar. 2, 2015, 1:35 
PM), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/economic-intelligence/2015/03/02/pri-
vatization-not-the-answer-for-saving-the-commons (“The concentration of rights 
creates an arms race that attracts capital and new technology to extract in ways 
that are ever more efficient (that’s a good thing), but which are also ever more 
destructive to the future productivity of the commons . . . . Given our pay-to-play 
politics, once rights get concentrated, it’s all too easy for the new owners to hijack 
the regulatory and legislative process.”). 
 188 See, e.g., Hale, supra note 185, at 472. 
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The responsibility to counter technology-driven injustice is crit-
ically important because of the pervasiveness of technology in con-
temporary society. Technological advancement in recent decades 
has offered solutions to many of humanity’s problems. However, it 
causes increasing inequality, primarily in the following two ways.  
First, access to the benefits of technological development is be-
coming increasingly unequal. A recent United Nations report re-
veals that more than half the world’s population lacks access to the 
Internet and its advantages.189 In the United States, access to tech-
nology is a determining factor in the knowledge divide between rich 
and poor youth.190 Unequal access to technology has magnified pre-
existing social problems and widened the divide between rich and 
poor.191  
Second, technology affects the distribution of social resources, 
especially in the labor market. Theoretically, all rational individuals, 
upon being replaced by automation, would simply acquire new skill-
sets to make themselves employable again in the labor market.192 
This is not observed in reality, however. Statistics show that signif-
icant proportions of workers displaced due to technological devel-
opments are simply not able to find new jobs.193 The apparent win-
ners capturing the economic benefits of technological innovation are 
the managers and owners of technology companies and other enti-
ties that apply productivity-boosting technologies.194 Wealth ends 
 
 189 Ray Downs, UN: Majority of World’s Population Lacks Internet Access, 
UPI (Sep. 18, 2017, 9:06 PM), https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-
News/2017/09/18/UN-Majority-of-worlds-population-lacks-internet-
access/6571505782626/. 
 190 Meghan Murphy, Technology as a Basic Need: The Impact of the Access 
Gap in Poverty, 1776 (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.1776.vc/insights/technology-
as-a-basic-need-the-impact-of-the-access-gap-in-poverty. 
 191 See, e.g., Daniele Selby, Millions of Students in the US Lack Access to 
Technology and High-Speed Internet, GLOBAL CITIZEN (Sept. 14, 2018), 
https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/verizon-innovative-learning-tech-pro-
gram/. 
 192 How Will Automation Affect Jobs, Skills, and Wages?, MCKINSEY & CO., 
https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/how-will-automa-
tion-affect-jobs-skills-and-wages (last visited Jan. 25, 2020). 
 193 See ANDREW YANG, THE WAR ON NORMAL PEOPLE: THE TRUTH ABOUT 
AMERICA’S DISAPPEARING JOBS AND WHY UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME IS OUR 
FUTURE xiii (2018). 
 194 Estlund, supra note 27, at 287. 
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up concentrated in the hands of these individuals through technol-
ogy’s replacement of labor force. 195  This exacerbates existing 
wealth inequality, making a small minority richer and the poor even 
more impoverished. 
A poignant example of the relationship between technology and 
injustice can be found in Silicon Valley, where the contrast between 
the immense amount of wealth accumulated by tech giants with pos-
sibly the largest camp of homeless people in the United States just 
twenty minutes away shows that booms no longer lift all boats.196 
Increased efficiency, productivity, and economic gains from tech-
nological advancement are not enjoyed by all. Instead, the high 
wages enjoyed by those employed in the technology industry have 
driven up the cost of living while wealth in the region is not propor-
tionally redistributed into the community.197 
2. SOCIAL JUSTICE AND TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES 
Based upon the preceding Section, I argue that technology com-
panies have a fundamental responsibility to confront injustices cre-
ated by technological development. This responsibility should le-
gally and ethically motivate them to counter both privatization-
driven and technology-driven injustices. 
With respect to their responsibility to counter privatization-
driven injustice, technology companies have to deal with the conflict 
between their intellectual property rights and the public’s enjoyment 
of the benefits of technological progress.198 Given that technology 
 
 195 David Rotman, Technology and Inequality, MIT TECH. REV., Nov.–Dec. 
2014, at 52, 56 (“As machines increasingly substitute for labor and building a 
business becomes less capital-intensive—you don’t need a printing plant to pro-
duce an online news site, or large investments to create an app—the biggest eco-
nomic winners will not be those owning conventional capital but, instead, those 
with the ideas behind innovative new products and successful business models.”). 
 196 Id. at 54; Robert Johnson, Welcome to ‘The Jungle’: The Largest Homeless 
Camp in Mainland USA Is Right in the Heart of Silicon Valley, BUS. INSIDER 
(Sept. 7, 2013, 10:52 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/the-jungle-largest-
homeless-camp-in-us-2013-8; Alexia Fernández Campbell et al., How Silicon 
Valley Created America’s Largest Homeless Camp, ATLANTIC (Nov. 25, 2014), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/11/how-silicon-valley-cre-
ated-americas-largest-homeless-camp/431739. 
 197 See Campbell et al., supra note 196. 
 198 See LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE 234–37 (2011). 
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companies can significantly affect the distribution and enjoyment of 
these benefits, the Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Ben-
efits of Scientific Progress and its Applications highlights the re-
sponsibility of corporations: 
the right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress 
and its applications may create tensions with the in-
tellectual property regime, which is a temporary mo-
nopoly with a valuable social function that should be 
managed in accordance with a common responsibil-
ity to prevent the unacceptable prioritization of profit 
for some over benefit for all.199 
As information creators, technology companies have exercised 
their intellectual property rights irresponsibly, causing privatization-
based injustice. The irresponsible exercise of copyright, for exam-
ple, has significantly increased the cost for the public of taking ad-
vantage of technologies to access and use copyrighted works. First, 
the copyright-based industry is making every effort to lobby the leg-
islature to adopt laws that provide increasingly stringent protection 
of copyright.200 As a result, the legal protection of technological 
measures has entitled copyright holders to lock up information, cop-
yright terms have been retroactively extended to place more works 
under proprietary control, and databases have been afforded 
stronger legal protection to fence off public access.201 At the same 
 
 199 UNESCO, THE RIGHT TO ENJOY THE BENEFITS OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 
AND ITS APPLICATIONS 15 (2019), https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/ 
pf0000185558; see also Farida Shaheed (Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cul-
tural Rights), Report of the Special Rapporteur in the Field of Cultural Rights: 
The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its Applications, ¶ 65, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/20/26 (May 14, 2012), https://www.ohchr.org/Docu-
ments/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A-HRC-20-26_en.pdf 
(pointing out that “legal scholars have increasingly questioned the economic ef-
fectiveness of intellectual property regimes in promoting scientific and cultural 
innovation. Scholars have found no evidence to support the assumption that sci-
entific creativity is only galvanized by legal protection or that the short-term costs 
of limiting dissemination are lower than the long-term gain of additional incen-
tives”). 
 200 See Louis Menand, Crooner in Rights Spat: Are Copyright Laws Too 
Strict?, NEW YORKER (Oct. 13, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/maga-
zine/2014/10/20/crooner-rights-spat. 
 201 See Sun, Copyright, supra note 64, at 272–78. 
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time, the recent expansion of copyright protection has severely jeop-
ardized the public interest accommodations in copyright law and 
significantly narrowed copyright limitations.202  
Second, fueled by the expansion of copyright protection, many 
copyright holders have in turn exercised their rights irresponsibly.203 
As the commercial value of copyrights has grown, corporations have 
taken possession of copyrights over a rapidly increasing number of 
works.204 Most corporations are profit-maximizing entities and are 
thus inclined to resort to aggressive copyright protection strategies. 
For example, the scope of copyright rights are routinely exaggerated 
to prevent members of the public from using copyrighted works in 
ways that the fair use doctrine would permit.205 Many copyright 
owners “only speak in terms of the advantage of property rights, and 
never the burdens that necessarily go with property ownership.”206 
Oftentimes, irresponsible exercise of intellectual property rights 
causes serious harm to the public interest in knowledge creation and 
diffusion. The marketing practice adopted by Elsevier, the world’s 
largest academic publisher, is a case in point. Despite the fact it has 
earned profit margins higher than top technology companies includ-
ing Apple, Google, and Amazon,207 Elsevier charges exorbitantly 
 
 202 Id. at 279. 
 203 Id. at 269–78. 
 204 At present, copyrights are largely concentrated in the hand of big media, 
including copyright-based entertainment, publishing, communications, and soft-
ware industries. Id. at 273. In the publishing, entertainment, and software indus-
tries, the prevailing business practice is to require individual creators of works to 
let their employers own their creations on the basis of the work-for-hire doctrine. 
See Neil J. Rosini, What’s a ‘Work for Hire’ and Why Should You Care?, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 3, 2014), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Whats-a-Work-
for-Hire-and/150333. Many individual creators of works have to transfer owner-
ship of their works to corporations through contractual arrangements that are 
semi-compulsory. See Orly Lobel, Opinion, My Ideas, My Boss’s Property, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 13, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/14/opinion/my-ideas-
my-bosss-property.html. This is, in part, because individual creators who need 
corporations to merchandize their works. 
 205 See JASON MAZZONE, COPYFRAUD AND OTHER ABUSES OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 12 (2011). 
 206 WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS 123 (2009). 
 207 Stephen Buranyi, Is the Staggeringly Profitable Business of Scientific Pub-
lishing Bad for Science?, GUARDIAN (June 27, 2017), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/science/2017/jun/27/profitable-business-scientific-publishing-bad-for-
science (“In 2010, Elsevier’s scientific publishing arm reported profits of £724m 
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high prices for subscriptions to individual journals and the purchase 
of individual articles. A top mathematics journal published by 
Princeton University Press charges $0.13 per page. In sharp contrast, 
the top ten Elsevier journals cost $1.30 per page or more.208 Many 
prominent universities and academics have already come into con-
flict with Elsevier for its unreasonably high subscription fees.209 Ne-
gotiations between the University of California (“UC”) and Elsevier 
for a new journal subscription contract broke down after UC’s sub-
scription expired in December 2018210 and approximately 350,000 
UC researchers and students’ access to Elsevier’s journal articles 
was cut off.211  
Moreover, technology companies have a responsibility to deal 
with technology-driven injustice. While rapid technological ad-
vancement has offered remarkable benefits for humanity, it has also 
created new problems of social injustice. Against this backdrop, 
technology companies should explore the extent to which the new 
technologies they develop would negatively affect societal interests 
at large and group interests in particular, and then take their own 
actions to tackle these problems or support related governmental 
measures.  
First, technology companies should consider how, for example, 
their newly developed technologies would negatively affect equality 
 
on just over £2bn in revenue. It was a 36% margin – higher than Apple, Google, 
or Amazon posted that year.”). 
 208 The Cost of Knowledge, http://gowers.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/else-
vierstatementfinal.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2020). 
 209 See, e.g., Sarah Zhang, The Real Cost of Knowledge, ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2019/03/uc-elsevier-pub-
lisher/583909. 
 210 Gretchen Kell, Why UC Split with Publishing Giant Elsevier, U.C. (Mar. 
6, 2019), https://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/why-uc-split-publishing-
giant-elsevier. 
 211 Diana Kwon, University of California Loses Access to New Content in 
Elsevier Journals, SCIENTIST (July 12, 2019), https://www.the-scien-
tist.com/news-opinion/university-of-california-loses-access-to-new-content-in-
elsevier-journals-66149. 
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of job market. Technologies such as automation and AI are trans-
forming labor markets and gradually resulting in job losses.212 Jobs 
replaced are typically middle-class jobs that require repetitive and 
predictable work,213 such as administrative, clerical, or production 
positions.214 This change in socioeconomic class composition in-
creases the wealth disparity between the rich and the poor.215 This 
additionally creates a higher supply of available low-skill, low-pay-
ing labor, and thereby depresses the wages of these positions, further 
increasing income and wealth inequality.216 Increased productivity 
resulting from technology means, for instance, that a firm once re-
quiring five accountants now only needs three to manage the same 
workload. As AI and automation-related technologies improve, the 
same firm may only require one accountant or no accountants at 
all.217 Increased productivity may ultimately result in a hypercom-
petitive labor market with increased stakes bringing it closer, if not 
completely, to a winner-takes-all situation.218  
Second, technology companies should consider how the design 
of their newly developed technologies would negatively impact 
group interests. Those who are marginalized or possess less wealth 
typically are not the primary target group of companies providing 
new technology-based products, because these groups typically lack 
sufficient buying power.219 Given that these people are outside com-
panies’ target consumer group, they are ignored in the design of new 
 
 212 OXFORD ECON., HOW ROBOTS CHANGE THE WORLD: WHAT AUTOMATION 
REALLY MEANS FOR JOBS AND PRODUCTIVITY 19–21 (2019), https://www.auto-
mation.com/pdf_articles/oxford/RiseOfTheRobotsFinal240619_Digital.pdf; 
Estlund, supra note 27, at 269 (2018). 
 213 OXFORD ECON., supra note 212, at 23. 
 214 Rotman, supra note 195, at 56–58. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 See, e.g., Jay Wacker, How Much Will AI Decrease the Need For Human 
Labor?, FORBES (Jan. 18, 2017, 1:16 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/ 
2017/01/18/how-much-will-ai-decrease-the-need-for-human-labor/#1ab19fb575 
c0. 
 218 Estlund, supra note 27, at 280. 
 219 For example, an increasing number of software and mobile apps require 
uninterrupted Internet connection to function. See List of Technology Design De-
cisions That Marginalize People, GEEK FEMINISM WIKI, https://geekfemi-
nism.wikia.org/wiki/List_of_technology_design_decisions_that_marginal-
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technologies, further marginalizing them and limiting their access to 
certain technologies.220 Even well-meaning initiatives can uninten-
tionally exclude marginalized groups. For example, when assisting 
a government project to increase accessibility of a public service by 
transferring that service online so that “anyone” can access it “at any 
time,” a technology company should examine in advance how par-
ticular groups of people would be affected. Without such scrutiny, 
this upgrade could unintentionally disadvantage those who are illit-
erate or visually impaired, among others, making a service that was 
once accessible to them inaccessible.  
D. Summary 
The three corporate fundamental responsibilities, as I have put 
forward, form a matrix of legal and ethical guidance for the benev-
olent behavior of technology companies. First, the responsibility to 
reciprocate users’ contributions is the base of this matrix, urging 
technology companies to take immediate action to appreciate and 
return those contributions by protecting those users’ private data ef-
fectively. Second, the responsibility to perform their role positively 
constitutes the pillars of the matrix, encouraging corporate manag-
ers’ ethical deliberations about how their companies could fulfill re-
sponsibilities in accordance with their three professional roles. 
Third, the responsibility to confront injustices created by technolog-
ical development acts as the beacon of light flashing on the top of 
the matrix. 221 It is the highest responsibility that technology compa-
nies should aspire to assume after they have fulfilled the first two 
responsibilities. 
The ethical theories of reciprocity, role responsibility, and social 
justice have been conventionally utilized to justify personal respon-
 
ize_people (last visited Jan. 26, 2020). This is technologically and financially in-
feasible in poor countries in which the information technology and communica-
tion infrastructure is significantly inadequate and the cost of Internet connection 
is beyond the affordability of the general public. Id. 
 220 See id. 
 221 Professor Purdy regards the responsibility for social justice as the highest 
aspiration because it requires “embracing both our creative ethical capacity and 
our sense of responsibility to make sense of and do justice, in every sense of that 
word” to society at large. Jedediah Purdy, Our Place in the World: A New Rela-
tionship for Environmental Ethics and Law, 62 DUKE L.J. 857, 932 (2013). 
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sibilities. Here, I have applied them to justify corporate responsibil-
ities, because the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil teaches that 
persons who control a company should be held responsible for any 
wrongdoing committed in their company’s name.222 
Piercing the veil of technology companies, it is their managers 
and shareholders who should bear these three fundamental respon-
sibilities. To fulfill them, they must learn how to manage the rela-
tionship between their institution and society. From this perspective, 
it is an ethical educational process in which those managers and 
shareholders learn how to become responsible members of a tech-
nological society.223 
III. ENFORCING CORPORATE FUNDAMENTAL 
RESPONSIBILITIES 
In this Part, I explore how the law should enforce the three cor-
porate fundamental responsibilities through specific legal responsi-
bilities requiring technology companies to protect personal data ef-
fectively and exercise their intellectual property rights properly. 
A. The Responsibility to Protect Personal Data Effectively 
1. NEW RESPONSIBILITIES FOR DATA PROTECTION 
Given the risk of privacy breaches caused by digital technolo-
gies, consumers now care more about protection of their personal 
data than ever before. This protection is of fundamental importance 
to the freedom and dignity of each individual. Unauthorized collec-
tion or disclosure of data such as home or email address, identifica-
tion card number, banking information, and medical records may 
infringe an individual’s right to privacy and create serious emotional 
 
 222 See, e.g., Broward Marine, Inc. v. S/V Zeus, No. 05-23105, 2010 WL 
427496, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1, 2010) (deciding to pierce the corporate veil and 
finding that the company’s dominant shareholder should be personally liable for 
the torts of his company); Ocala Breeders’ Sales Co. v. Hialeah, Inc., 735 So. 2d 
542, 543–44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (piercing the corporate veil to pursue the 
personal liability of corporate officers). 
 223 As Hannah Arendt reminds us, “men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit 
the world.” HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 7 (2d ed. 1998). No human 
being lives alone in the world. Rather, human beings live together in a common 
world, from birth to death. 
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distress or financial harm. Widespread collection of big data has ex-
acerbated the problem. The secretive collection of big data has be-
come normalized in the digital world, making all consumers very 
vulnerable.  
The protection of personal data frequently triggers cross-juris-
dictional issues as technology companies face different legal stand-
ards across the globe.224 For example, the U.S. protection regime is 
grounded in consumer protection, encouraging fairness of exchange 
of private data. By contrast, the E.U. framework adopts a rights-
based approach to data protection by recognizing and protecting the 
fundamental right to privacy.225 
Against this backdrop, I argue that technology companies should 
treat private data protection as a core part of their fundamental re-
sponsibilities. First, this is required by technology companies’ fun-
damental responsibility to reciprocate their users’ contributions. 
Having collected personal data from their users, technology compa-
nies should appreciate users’ contributions to their data reservoir 
and make every effort to protect this data effectively.  
Second, role responsibility requires that technology companies 
play their professional role as data collectors well. This role gives 
them the authority to control personal data, which is one of the 
world’s most valuable resources.226 Their role responsibility then re-
quires them to closely examine the fact that their collection and fur-
 
 224 Robert Levine, Behind the European Privacy Ruling That’s Confounding 
Silicon Valley, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), https://www.ny-
times.com/2015/10/11/business/international/behind-the-european-privacy-rul-
ing-thats-confounding-silicon-valley.html (“International data transfers are the 
lifeblood of the digital economy.”). 
 225 See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dig-
nity Versus Liberty, 113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1157 (2004) (pointing out that “it has 
become common for Europeans to maintain that they respect a ‘fundamental right 
to privacy’ that is either weak or wholly absent in the ‘cultural context’ of the 
United States”); Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 78, at 121 (finding that “the EU 
system protects the individual by granting her fundamental rights pertaining to 
data protection” and that “U.S. law protects the individual as a privacy con-
sumer”). 
 226 The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data, 
ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-
worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data. 
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ther utilization of personal data may affect their users’ private inter-
ests in dignity227 as well as the larger societal interests in data secu-
rity.228 Moreover, technology companies should consider how they 
can exercise their authority in utilizing personal data in ways that 
adequately protect users’ private interests and societal interests as 
well.    
To legally fulfill these two responsibilities, I propose that tech-
nology companies should adopt the fundamental principles for data 
protection under the GDPR,229 which took effect in the European 
Union in May 2018.230 The GDPR sets the world’s highest standards 
for protecting E.U. residents’ right to personal data and enforcing 
data collectors’ duties.231 It is applicable to any company that pro-
cesses E.U. residents’ personal data. This proposal would require 
 
 227 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (“The overriding 
function of the Fourth Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity 
against unwarranted intrusion by the State.”); Robert C. Post, The Social Founda-
tions of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. 
REV. 957,1008 (1989) (concluding that privacy protection rules “enable individ-
uals to receive and to express respect, and to that extent are constitutive of human 
dignity”); Whitman, supra note 225, at 1161 (“Continental privacy protections 
are, at their core, a form of protection of a right to respect and personal dignity.”). 
 228 See Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1914 
(2013) (using electronic voting as an example to show the importance of data se-
curity); Anupam Chander et al., Catalyzing Privacy Law 29 (Univ. Colo. Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 19-25, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa-
pers.cfm?abstract_id=3433922 (“Over the last year, the United States has seen an 
unprecedented volume of legislative proposals regulating data privacy at the state 
level. This burst of interest has manifested in multiple types of laws: on data se-
curity, on internet service provider (ISP) privacy, on specific types of data, and 
on comprehensive data privacy.”).     
 229 GDPR, supra note 35. 
 230 The General Data Protection Regulation Applies in All Member States 
from 25 May 2018, EUR-LEX (May 24, 2018), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/con-
tent/news/general-data-protection-regulation-GDPR-applies-from-25-May-
2018.html. 
 231 It is this stringency, comprehensiveness of data privacy protection, and 
flexibility that make the GDPR the global gold standard for protecting the privacy 
and rights of data subjects. Lydia de la Torre, GDPR Matchup: The California 
Consumer Privacy Act 2018, IAPP (July 31, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/gdpr-
matchup-california-consumer-privacy-act/ (“Most data protection professionals 
would agree that the GDPR sets the global ‘gold-standard’ for data protection and 
has forced companies across the globe to significantly update their data practices 
and ramp up their compliance programs.”). The GDPR provides a harmonizing 
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technology companies to operate a two-tiered private data protection 
mechanism. 
First, technology companies should comply with the GDPR in 
good faith if they collect private data belonging to those residing in 
the European Union. In that context, they are legally subject to reg-
ulation by the GDPR given its mandate of extraterritorial applica-
tion.232 When E.U. residents use Amazon, Facebook, WhatsApp, 
and Apple Pay, the relevant U.S. technology companies process 
their personal data. If these companies make every effort to follow 
the GDPR to enhance data protection, they would prove their com-
mitment to treating their E.U. users’ right to privacy seriously. In 
demonstrating their ability to comply with the stringent data protec-
tion standards of the GDPR, they would further convince the inter-
national community that they are truly devoted to safeguarding the 
security of personal data. 
Second, technology companies should consider adopting the 
GDPR as their internal privacy compliance guidelines. Although the 
GDPR is not legally applicable to technology companies collecting 
private data from those residing outside the European Union, these 
companies could still regard the GDPR as a model law for improv-
ing their protection of private data, proactively ensuring that their 
data protection measures live up to the GDPR’s principles.233 As 
they expand their businesses across the globe, technology compa-
nies need to tackle data protection in each country or region in which 
they process data. Data privacy laws vary significantly among coun-
tries, and some have none. No international treaties have been 
adopted to govern data protection globally. In the face of such legal 
complexities, technology companies’ adoption of the GDPR as their 
internal guidelines would ensure that their products or services are 
 
force for data privacy protection legislation globally. Id. This force stems both 
from being the gold standard for data privacy protection and the GDPR’s influ-
ence through the requirements it places on receiving parties of data transfers orig-
inating from the European Union. Id. 
 232 GDPR, supra note 35, art. 3(2) (prescribing that the GDPR “applies to the 
processing of personal data of data subjects who are in the Union by a controller 
or processor not established in the Union”). 
 233 See Chander et al., supra note 228 at 20–21 (“The GDPR quintessentially 
targets compliance from an organizational perspective: it attempts to build up a 
particular kind of responsible corporate infrastructure, including internal positions 
and processes”). 
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fully compliant with the highest of data protection standards. This 
strategy would send the message to consumers around the world that 
they take personal data protection seriously and believe that every-
one deserves the same high level of personal data protection.234  
2. GDPR’S CORE PRINCIPLES 
In this Section, I discuss the core principles that technology 
companies must comply with under the GDPR. As commentators 
have observed,235 these principles have been adopted by the Califor-
nia Consumer Privacy Act.236 Guided by these principle, the opera-
tion of a two-tiered mechanism would put technology companies in 
a better position to keep their data protection measures in full com-
pliance with new regulatory regimes.237  
a. Proactive Protection 
The idea of privacy by design was incorporated into the GDPR’s 
predecessor legislation, the Data Protection Directive, and required 
technical measures to be designed and built into data processing sys-
tem to protect data safety.238 The European Union takes a proactive 
approach towards personal data protection aimed at preventing data 
breaches and the resulting harms. 239  By integrating protective 
measures into the system, personal data protection is positioned at 
the core of the data system itself, as opposed to being a patchwork 
 
 234 See Bryan Casey et al., Rethinking Explainable Machines: The GDPR’s 
“Right to Explanation” Debate and the Rise of Algorithmic Audits in Enterprise, 
34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 143, 187 (2019) (discussing the public relations benefits 
of following the GDPR). 
 235 See Chander et al., supra note 228, at 14–18. 
 236 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–1798.199 (West 2018). 
 237 See Stuart D. Levi, California Privacy Law: What Companies Should Do 
to Prepare in 2019, SKADDEN (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.skadden.com/in-
sights/publications/2019/01/2019-insights/california-privacy-law (concluding 
that “companies that have become GDPR-compliant may have an approach to 
data protection that will be useful in adapting to the CCPA’s requirements”). 
 238 GDPR: Privacy by Design, INTERSOFT CONSULTING, https://gdpr-
info.eu/issues/privacy-by-design (last visited Jan. 26, 2020). 
 239 See, e.g., Data Protection by Design and Default, INFO. COMMISSIONER’S 
OFF., https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-
general-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/data-
protection-by-design-and-default (last visited Jan. 26, 2020). 
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modification that is added later. This integration purportedly im-
proves adherence to data protection measures, resulting in a more 
secure system that better protects data and data subjects.240 
The specific form of technological protection is not specified 
within the GDPR, but context dictates the level of protective 
measures required to be built into the data system.241 Factors such 
as the scope and amount of data processing, the nature of the data 
processed, and the risks posed to rights and freedoms by processing 
determine the ultimate level of safeguards that must be imple-
mented.242 In certain instances, measures such as pseudonymiza-
tion, encryption, or anonymization can each by themselves satisfy 
the requirement of privacy by design. In other situations, commen-
surate with the higher data privacy stakes involved, a higher stand-
ard of protection consisting of a combination of methods would be 
required. Data protection rules, such as data minimization, should 
also be implemented through design and built into the data sys-
tem.243 
b. User-Centric Protection 
Consent and contract are two ways in which data subjects (or 
users) can allow the processing of their personal data as an exception 
to the general prohibition on data processing.244 These two rules, ar-
guably, empower data subjects to decide for themselves which data 
controllers to interact with and what extent of data processing is ac-
ceptable.  
 
 240 GDPR: Privacy by Design, supra note 238. But see Supreeth Shastri et al., 
The Seven Sins of Personal-Data Processing Systems Under GDPR, USENIX 
Ass’n, https://www.usenix.org/system/files/hotcloud19-paper-shastri.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2020) (arguing that some GDPR regulations conflict with the de-
sign, architecture, and operation of modern computing systems). 
 241 See, e.g., GDPR, supra note 35, recital 78, art. 25. 
 242 Id. art. 25. 
 243 Id. art. 5(1)(c). For discussion of the principle of data minimization see 
Filippo A. Raso, Note, Innovating in Uncertainty: Effective Compliance and the 
GDPR, HARV. J.L. & TECH. DIG., Aug. 14, 2018, at 5–6, https://jolt.law.har-
vard.edu/digest/innovating-in-uncertainty-effective- compliance-and-the-gdpr; 
Tal Z. Zarsky, Incompatible: The GDPR in the Age of Big Data, 47 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 995, 1009–11 (2017). 
 244 Schwartz & Peifer, supra note 78, at 142. 
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Consequently, the requirements for a valid legal consent to use 
one’s private data detailed in the GDPR set a high standard, thus 
protecting the interests of the data subject. Under the GDPR, consent 
must be (1) freely given, (2) specific, (3) informed, and (4) unam-
biguous.245 Although there is no specified form required for consent, 
consent given by the data subject must be a clear affirmative act or 
statement to satisfy the unambiguity requirement.246 Consent cannot 
be implied and must always be opt-in as opposed to opt-out.247 Re-
quiring opt-in consent is again consistent with the fundamental start-
ing position in the European Union, where data processing is pro-
hibited by default and there must be some reason to justify pro-
cessing. Accordingly, the default position cannot be that consent is 
given unless the user opts out. 
If the data controller relies on consent as the legal basis for data 
processing, the data controller is not allowed to switch the legal ba-
sis from consent to another basis even if this other valid basis has 
always existed.248 In other words, if the data controller decides to 
use consent as its legal basis and consent is withdrawn, the controller 
cannot continue to process the data by relying on a different legal 
basis, even if such a basis is legitimate and existed from the begin-
ning. 
c. Transparent Protection 
The GDPR aims to maintain the transparency of data protection 
through protecting the right of access, which allows data subjects to 
review what personal data is possessed by the controller and how 
this data is being used.249 By enshrining this right, the GDPR em-
 
 245 GDPR, supra note 35, art. 4(11). 
 246 Id. recital 32. 
 247 What is Valid Consent?, INFO. COMMISSIONER’S OFF., 
https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-gen-
eral-data-protection-regulation-gdpr/consent/what-is-valid-consent (last visited 
Jan. 26, 2020); Claire Laybats & John Davies, GDPR: Implementing the Regula-
tions, 35 BUS. INFO. REV. 81, 81 (2018); Samuel Greengard, Weighing the Impact 
of GDPR, COMM. ACM, Nov. 2018, at 16, 16 (“GDPR takes this concept to a new 
and previously untested level.”). 
 248 GDPR: Consent, INTERSOFT CONSULTING, https://gdpr-info.eu/issues/con-
sent/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2020). 
 249 GDPR, supra note 35, art. 15. 
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powers the data subject to obtain information about their data inter-
ests. Access to this type of information is integral for the subject to 
exercise their other rights. For example, a data subject would not be 
able to exercise their right of erasure of personal data if they do not 
know that their data is under possession and use in the first place. 
Upon request from a data subject, the controller is required to con-
duct a check.250 
To protect a right of access, the GDPR requires that a compre-
hensive account of data processing and a copy of personal data must 
be provided free of charge, either in writing, electronically, or ver-
bally, depending on circumstances.251 There is a “without undue de-
lay” requirement for the provision of this information to the subject, 
meaning it must be provided at most within one month barring ex-
ceptional circumstances.252 A data controller can only charge a fee 
if additional copies of the information are requested, and then the 
fee must reflect administrative costs and cannot be a profit-earning 
amount.253 The controller may require a more specified request from 
the subject that narrows down the data in question if the controller 
processes a large volume of information about the subject,254 and 
may refuse a request if it is unjustified or excessive.255 
d. Professional Protection 
The GDPR requires firms to employ a Data Protection Officer 
(“DPO”) to oversee and manage the compliance of controllers who 
frequently process data.256 This requirement to employ a DPO is not 
based on the size of the firm, but on its core activities.257 If a firm’s 
operations involve extensive processing of sensitive personal data, 
the GDPR requires that firm to employ a DPO.258 The GDPR holds 
public bodies to a higher standard, however, and requires them all 
to employ DPOs.259 
 
 250 Id. 
 251 Id. art. 12. 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. recital 63. 
 255 Id. art. 12(5). 
 256 Id. recital 97. 
 257 Id. art. 37(1). 
 258 Id. art. 37(1)(c). 
 259 Id. art. 37(1)(a). 
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The DPO ensures compliance with the GDPR and must be 
knowledgeable in the fields of data protection and practices to an 
extent commensurate with the scale and complexity of the data pro-
cessing conducted by the firm.260 He or she acts as the liaison for 
data privacy and protection matters with supervisory authorities, 
employees, and data subjects.261 A DPO can be an internal employee 
or an external specialist but must not have any conflicts of interest 
arising from supervision of their own work done in a different ca-
pacity.262 In addition to ensuring compliance with all data protection 
laws, the DPO is responsible for tasks including assessing data pro-
tection impact, increasing employee awareness of data protection 
and conducting employee training, and collaborating with supervi-
sory authorities.263 
B. The Responsibility to Exercise Intellectual Property Rights 
Properly 
Intellectual property is supremely important in the economic and 
cultural development of modern society. It regulates the ways in 
which creativity and innovation are protected and disseminated with 
technologies, whether print or digital.264 
In this Section, I argue that technology companies should exer-
cise their intellectual property rights responsibly so as to confront 
injustices caused by technological development. Courts should take 
this responsibility into consideration when they decide on intellec-
tual property cases that may have significant impact on social jus-
tice. As Federal Trade Commission v. Qualcomm shows, a crucial 
 
 260 Id. art. 37(5). 
 261 Id. art. 38(4), 39(1). 
 262 Data Protection Officer (DPO), EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION 
SUPERVISOR, https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/data-protection/reference-li-
brary/data-protection-officer-dpo_en (last visited Jan. 28, 2020). 
 263 GDPR, supra note 35, art. 39(1). 
 264 See, e.g., JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS 
OF THE MIND 7 (2008) (“Copyright law is supposed to give us a self-regulating 
cultural policy in which the right to exclude others from one’s original expression 
fuels a vibrant public sphere indirectly driven relationship by popular demand.”); 
Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Distributive Values in Copyright, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1535, 1537 (2005) (“Copyright law generally addresses the relationship between 
creative expression and money in terms of maximizing total creativity.”). 
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step courts could take is to curb the expansive patent rights of tech-
nology companies by requiring them to license their essential stand-
ard patents in fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) 
terms.265 
1. Federal Trade Commission V. QUALCOMM 
The FTC sued Qualcomm before the District Court for the 
Northern District of California. The FTC alleged that Qualcomm’s 
anticompetitive behavior relating to its patent licensing practices vi-
olated § 5 of the FTC Act, which prohibits “[u]nfair methods of 
competition in or affecting commerce.”266 Qualcomm is the industry 
leader for modem chipsets that facilitate the connection of devices 
to wireless networks.267 The company holds many patents, includ-
ing those extending beyond the technologies present in the physical 
chipsets. Qualcomm bundled together all the patents it deemed nec-
essary for its chipsets to function within a device, and then licensed 
these patents through one licensing agreement on a “portfolio ba-
sis.”268 These patents consisted of cellular standard essential patents 
(“SEPs”), non-cellular SEPs, and non-SEPs.269 Even during the ne-
gotiation stage, Qualcomm refused to provide customers with a list 
of their patents or patent claim charts.270 Qualcomm also refused to 
sell chipsets to those who did not sign a corresponding patent port-
folio licensing agreement, namely the “no license, no chips” busi-
ness model.271 This forced companies to expend money twice when 
dealing with Qualcomm: once when licensing patents, and once 
when buying the actual chips. Qualcomm also required customers 
to cross-license their own patents, at zero royalties, as part of the 
agreement.272 
Qualcomm’s market power is partially derived from its own ef-
forts and ingenuity. It is also in large part attributable to private 
 
 265 See discussion infra Section III.B.2. 
 266 Id. at 669. 
 267 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 665–66 
(N.D. Cal. 2019). 
 268 Id. at 672. 
 269 Id. at 672–74. 
 270 Id. at 724–25 
 271 Id. 
 272 Id. 
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standard-setting organizations such as the Alliance for Telecommu-
nications Industry Solutions and the Telecommunications Industry 
Association selecting Qualcomm’s technology as the standard to 
which all devices, components, and networks must conform.273 In 
order to be interoperable, all devices need to use the same Qual-
comm-owned standard essential technologies.274 
In May 2019, the District Court ruled against Qualcomm, decid-
ing that it unlawfully secured a monopoly position in the chip supply 
market through extensive anticompetitive conduct.275 The District 
Court found that Qualcomm’s coercion and threats were effected 
through different mechanisms, such as its “no license, no chips” 
business model.276 It required customers to cross-license their pa-
tents in exchange for the rights to Qualcomm’s patents,277 refused to 
license its SEPs to modem chip manufacturers despite its commit-
ment to standard-setting organizations to do so on FRAND terms,278 
entered into de facto exclusive chip supply agreements, 279  and 
charged unreasonably high royalty rates for SEPs.280 The victims in-
cluded many original equipment manufacturers and technology 
companies,281 with Apple, Intel, Samsung, LG Electronics, Sony, 
Huawei, and many more affected by Qualcomm’s practices.282  
The court held that Qualcomm’s conduct reduced competition 
in the chipset market.283 This reduced competition likely forestalled 
the advancement of technology, since the suppression of competi-
tors and depression of their revenue led to reduced R&D spending 
on the competitors’ end.284 Reduced competition also reduces the 
 
 273 Id. at 751–52. 
 274 Id.  
 275 Id. at 681. 
 276 Id. at 698. 
 277 Id. 
 278 Id. at 744–51. 
 279 Id. at 766. 
 280 Id. at 773. 
 281 Id. at 699. 
 282 Id. at 670 
 283 Id. at 681. 
 284 Id. at 695–96. 
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incentive of market dominant firms (in this case Qualcomm) to in-
novate and provide a better product. 285  A permanent injunction 
against future anticompetitive actions by Qualcomm was granted.286 
Qualcomm appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit and applied for a stay of the execution of the injunctive order 
pending appeal. In August 2019, the Ninth Circuit granted an order, 
partially staying the District Court’s ruling that required Qualcomm 
to license patents to rivals, terminate its practice of supplying chips 
to customers on condition that they have signed a patent license, and 
negotiate or renegotiate license terms with customers in that re-
spect.287 In February 2020, the Ninth Circuit heard the substantive 
appeal.288 
2. USING PATENTS TO PROMOTE SOCIAL JUSTICE 
SEPs are foundational patents required for devices to be interop-
erable on the same standard or network.289 Standards are usually de-
veloped by industry members in concert by de facto wide usage or 
through standard-setting organizations (“SSOs”).290 Certain patents 
are essential for the compliance of the standard when market partic-
ipants are incapable of designing around those patents or no alterna-
tive technology exists and is available. As a result, when an SSO 
such as the Telecommunications Industry Association or Alliance 
for Telecommunications Industry Solutions selects a standard, it 
 
 285 Richard Blundell et al., Market Share, Market Value and Innovation in a 
Panel of British Manufacturing Firms, 66 REV. ECON. STUD. 529, 550 (1999). 
286  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 818-24 (N.D. 
Cal. 2019). 
 287  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm, Inc., 935 F.3d 752, 757 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 288  Kristen Osenga, Anticompetitive or Hyper-Competitive? An Analysis of 
the FTC v. Qualcomm Oral Argument, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 20, 2020), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/02/20/anticompetitive-hyper-competitive-
analysis-ftc-v-qualcomm-oral-argument/id=119124. 
 289 See generally Standardized Technology and Standard Essential Patents, 
FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attach-
ments/press-releases/google-agrees-change-its-business-practices-resolve-ftc-
competition-concerns-markets-devices-smart/130103google-seps.pdf (last vis-
ited March 4, 2020). 
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usually requires the entity owning the SEPs pertaining to the stand-
ard to commit to licensing these patents on FRAND terms.291 Oth-
erwise, the SSO will not adopt the standard. This practice ensures 
that interoperability can occur as opposed to uni-operability due to 
market monopoly and patent holdup.292 It also protects the public 
interest in promoting competition, ensuring that potential competi-
tors are able to compete and innovate.293 Without FRAND terms, 
patent holders could monopolize the market by creating an essen-
tially infinitely high barrier to entry. 294  On the other hand, the 
FRAND commitment enables patent holders to obtain fair and rea-
sonable compensations from licensing their SEPs.295 
Some experts have argued that the FRAND terms should be 
deemed a contractual obligation between technology companies like 
Qualcomm and standard-setting organizations. 296  It then follows 
that other technology companies cannot avail themselves of 
FRAND terms to have SEPs licensed to them. Nor would they have 
 
 291 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm, Inc., No. 17-CV-00220-LHK, 2017 
WL 2774406, at *2 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2017) (holding that without FRAND terms 
“a patent holder might be able to parlay the standardization of its technology into 
a monopoly in standard-compliant products”) (citations omitted); Broadcom 
Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 314 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Firms may become 
locked in to a standard requiring the use of a competitor’s patented technology. 
The patent holder’s IPRs, if unconstrained, may permit it to demand supracompet-
itive royalties. It is in such circumstances that measures such as FRAND commit-
ments become important safeguards against monopoly power.”); Microsoft Corp. 
v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2015) (“To mitigate the risk that 
a SEP holder will extract more than the fair value of its patented technology, many 
SSOs require SEP holders to agree to license their patents on ‘reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory’ or ‘RAND’ terms. Under these agreements, an SEP holder 
cannot refuse a license to a manufacturer who commits to paying the RAND 
rate.”). 
 292 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 696 F.3d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 293 See Benjamin C. Li, The Global Convergence of FRAND Licensing Prac-
tices: Towards “Interoperable” Legal Standards, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 429, 
434–35 (2016). 
 294 Id. at 435 (“Many SSOs have therefore adopted FRAND policies to prevent 
SEP holders from exercising this type of unjustified post-adoption leverage.”). 
295  See Kirti Gupta, Technology Standards and Competition in the Mobile 
Wireless Industry, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 865, 868 (2015). 
 296 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Set-
ting Organizations, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1909 (2002). 
960 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74:898 
 
standing to sue the technology company in question for its violation 
of FRAND terms.297 
I argue against this proposition. Drawing on the Qualcomm rul-
ing, I contend that courts should redefine FRAND terms as technol-
ogy companies’ responsibility to prevent injustice created by tech-
nological development. Technology companies as patent holders 
can derive huge benefits from standardization of technologies be-
cause such standardization creates huge patent licensing markets for 
them. From this perspective, technology companies are bound to re-
ceive fair and reasonable return for their investments in developing 
standard-essential technologies as long as these technologies are 
adopted into industry-wide standards by SSOs. The elimination of 
financial risk of sustaining losses for their patented technologies, 
coupled with a common interest to share scientific advances and its 
benefit across all consumers, justifies imposing an obligation on 
technology companies to open up their SEPs on FRAND terms in 
order to facilitate the diffusion of technology. 
The Qualcomm ruling condemns actions taken by Qualcomm 
that suppressed the ability of other technology companies to acquire 
SEPs on FRAND terms.298 The court found that Qualcomm had an 
antitrust duty as well as FRAND commitments to license its SEPs 
to rival modem chip suppliers, but Qualcomm refused to do so be-
cause it could extract more lucrative royalty rates from dealing ex-
clusively with original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”) and had 
an anticompetitive intent to exclude competition.299 Qualcomm’s 
refusal to license SEPs to rival modem chip suppliers did not only 
“promote[] rivals’ exit from the market, prevent[] rivals’ entry, and 
delay[] or hamper[] the entry and success of other rivals”, but also 
hampered competition by increasing the costs to OEMs because it 
 
 297 Cf. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 864 F. Supp. 2d 1023, 1033 (W.D. 
Wash. 2012) (“Accordingly, Microsoft is a third-party beneficiary to Motorola’s 
agreements with the IEEE and the ITU to license its standard essential patents on 
RAND terms, and therefore, Microsoft may sue for breach of that agreement.”); 
Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1085 (W.D. Wis. 
2012) (“As a potential user of the standards at issue and a prospective licensee of 
essential patents, Apple is a third party beneficiary of the agreements between 
Motorola and IEEE and Motorola and ETS.”). 
 298 Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Qualcomm, Inc., 411 F. Supp. 3d 658, 681 (N.D. 
Cal. 2019). 
 299  Id. at 744–62. 
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was able to abuse its monopoly power to demand unreasonably high 
royalty rates.300 End consumers were ultimately harmed by OEMs’ 
passing on of costs. By condemning these actions and holding Qual-
comm liable for them, the ruling, therefore, imposes upon technol-
ogy companies a responsibility to prevent injustice caused by licens-
ing of standard essential patents without FRAND terms. 
The Qualcomm ruling further reinforces FRAND terms as a re-
sponsibility to prevent injustice in patent licensing. It reveals that 
obligating patent holders to license their SEPs on FRAND terms 
alone is incapable of preventing injustice in patent licensing when 
patent holders owning a dominant share of the market abuse their 
monopoly power to get around FRAND commitments. They can 
still engage in anticompetitive conduct, such as tying their SEPs to 
the supply of chipsets under a “no license, no chips” business 
model.301 By tying the two products (patents and chips) together, 
patent holders are able to get around FRAND obligations by simply 
charging a premium on the good or service tied to the SEPs. For 
example, Qualcomm licenses its patents to a technology company at 
a fair price but demands that the company also buys chips from them 
and then charges 300% of the normal market price for the chips. On 
paper, the technology company has managed to have the SEPs li-
censed to them on FRAND terms. But in reality, Qualcomm has 
earned an exorbitant windfall by forcing that company to buy its 
chips. Injustice in patent licensing in this case, therefore, arises be-
cause Qualcomm has precluded that company from buying much 
less expensive chips.  
C. Summary: The Fusion of Corporate Responsibilities and 
Powers 
The concept of corporate fundamental responsibility is not in-
tended to substantially harm the interests of technology companies. 
It does not erode any legal confinements of the Fifth Amendment 
that guard private property by prohibiting “[taking] private prop-
erty . . . for public use, without just compensation.”302 This is be-
cause the concept does not advocate deprivation of private property 
 
 300  Id. at 744–51. 
 301 Id. at 702. 
 302 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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belonging to technology companies in any manner. Nor does it pre-
vent them from reaping the benefits of their investments by selling 
their products in the marketplace. 
The concept of corporate fundamental responsibility is intended 
to hold technology companies responsible for the market powers 
they have gained. Companies are expected to pay due respect to us-
ers’ interests in their private data, reciprocating these users’ contri-
butions in sharing information, and increasing their advertising rev-
enues. Therefore, the costs of protecting private user data should be 
understood as a means of fulfilling technology companies’ respon-
sibility to reciprocate. The companies should bear those costs, treat-
ing them as a precondition to starting their technology businesses. 
The same holds true for the costs that technology companies have to 
bear in fulfilling their responsibilities to play their role positively 
and confront injustices created by technological development. Since 
the market powers of technology companies are only legally and 
ethically legitimate if they act to fulfill these fundamental responsi-
bilities, bearing such costs should be inherently embedded in their 
business operations. 
CONCLUSION 
A recent study revealed that 42% of American adults credit the 
biggest improvements in their lives to technology; a greater percent-
age than those citing the expansion of civil rights and the economy 
in the past five decades.303 In this age of rapid technological devel-
opment, however, the power gained by technology companies far 
exceeds the responsibilities they have assumed. 304 Rather than in-
terrogating the responsibilities of technology companies, however, 
there has been greater focus on celebrating the astounding wealth 
 
 303 Mark Strauss, Four-in-Ten Americans Credit Technology with Improving 
Life Most in The Past 50 Years, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 12, 2017), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/10/12/four-in-ten-americans-credit-
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 304 See Javier Espinoza & Sam Fleming, Margrethe Vestager Eyes Toughen-
ing ‘Burden of Proof’ for Big Tech, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2019), 
https://www.ft.com/content/24635a5c-fa4f-11e9-a354-36acbbb0d9b6 (reporting 
the E.U. antitrust chief’s view that “companies such as Google should bear extra 
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they have amassed from stock markets and their users through the 
exercise of their power.  
In response, this Article has put forward the concept of corporate 
fundamental responsibility as the ethical and legal foundation for 
imposing three enhanced responsibilities upon technology compa-
nies: reciprocating users’ contributions, playing their role positively, 
and confronting injustices created by technological development. I 
have further considered how these responsibilities could be enacted 
to improve protection of private data and to encourage technology 
companies to exercise intellectual property rights responsibly. 
Where technology permeates the fabric of society and individual 
life, it is a lot easier for everyone, including technology company 
leaders, to believe in technological determinism: a theory that ele-
vates technology as a panacea for all social ills and individual prob-
lems.305 But the answer to the technology is not in the technology. 
A single-minded reliance on technology’s power—without consid-
eration of the responsibility that attaches to it—is not a path toward 
a better future for all humankind. The concept of corporate funda-
mental responsibility, as this Article has proposed, shows that ethics 
must come together with technology. This should be the mission of 
technology company leaders who, in developing new technologies, 
collecting data, and regulating speech, must act responsibly for the 
future of humanity. 
 
 305 See JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 3 (1964) (“No social, 
human, or spiritual fact is so important as the fact of techn[ology] in the modern 
world.”); Gaia Bernstein, When New Technologies Are Still New: Windows of Op-
portunity for Privacy Protection, 51 VILL. L. REV. 921, 929 (2006) (“Technolog-
ical determinism is the view of technology as an autonomous entity that develops 
according to an internal logic and direction of its own, resulting in determinate 
impacts on society.”). 
